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This Article examines the appropriate balance between public and private
enforcement of statutes seeking to distribute resources or social services to a
socioeconomically diverse set of beneficiaries through a case study of the federal
special education law, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).
It focuses particularly on the extent to which the Act’s enforcement regime suffi-
ciently enforces the law for the poor.  The Article responds to the frequent con-
tention that private enforcement of statutory regimes is necessary to compensate
for the shortcomings of public enforcement.  Public enforcement, the story goes,
is inefficient and relies on underfunded, captured, or impotent government
agencies, while private parties are appropriately incentivized to act as private
attorneys general.  This Article challenges that argument as not applicable to
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all circumstances.  Instead, it uses the IDEA to identify certain features of insti-
tutional design that can make heavy reliance on private enforcement lead to
predictable disparities in enforcement in favor of wealthier beneficiaries as
opposed to poor beneficiaries, in contravention of the stated goals of some stat-
utes.  These features of institutional design include universal rather than
means-tested service provision distributed by relying on nontransparent, non-
precedential, private bargaining over a highly individualized system where the
contours of the right are determined through significant amounts of agency
discretion.  Where these features are present, the Article argues, greater attention
to public enforcement, as opposed to private enforcement, is likely to be necessary
if the goal is to avoid enforcement disparities in favor of wealthier beneficiaries.
Alternatively, modifying these features may reduce enforcement disparities and
make public enforcement less necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars frequently focus on the importance of private enforce-
ment of statutory regimes in a variety of fields with a concomitant nod
to the limits of public enforcement.1  They point to the efficiency of
private enforcement, since private parties will take action only when
the expected value of doing so outweighs their expected costs.2  They
note the significance of private parties acting as private attorneys gen-
eral3 and explore how both class actions and serial individual actions
can produce policy change.4  They express concern about relying on
underfunded, captured, or impotent government agencies to enforce
the law.5  In turn, this focus on private enforcement results in
expressions of dismay at doctrinal and legislative cutbacks on such
enforcement;6 advocacy around creating private rights of action in
legislation or permitting private enforcement through judicially
1 See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on
Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1132–34 (2007) (highlighting the shortcomings of public
enforcement); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58
DUKE L.J. 345, 409 (2008) (arguing that private enforcement is necessary for some
statutes “because the threat that federal funds will be withheld is remote at best”).
2 See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 167, 168–69 (1985) (“[P]rivate enforcement agents, unlike govern-
ment regulators, will possess ongoing economic interests directly related to the costs
and benefits of public policy implementation.”).
3 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 183, 186 (describing the essential role of private attorneys general in civil rights
enforcement).
4 See, e.g., Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on Political Lawyering,
31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297–305 (1996) (describing role of private actions in a
variety of contexts, including statutory enforcement).
5 See, e.g., Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 1, at 1133–34 (describing these con- R
cerns); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1458–59 (1998) (same); Matthew C. Stephen-
son, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administra-
tive Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 108–09, 130–31 (2005) (same).
6 See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 3, at 187 (criticizing attempts to limit private R
enforcement).
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implied private rights of action or § 1983 suits;7 and even suggestions
that some government enforcement agencies ought to go out of
business.8
There is no doubt that private action can play a significant role in
enforcing statutory regimes, for all of the above reasons.  But at the
same time, there are serious questions about whether scholars and
policymakers can place too much emphasis on private enforcement
when more public enforcement is actually necessary to effectuate the
goals of a statute.  The burdens associated with private enforcement—
burdens that may be disproportionately more difficult for people in
poverty—cast doubt on arguments for greater reliance on private
enforcement as a general matter.9  Moreover, evidence that many vio-
lations go unreported further suggests that overreliance on private
enforcement may result in underenforcement of the law.10  This prob-
lem may be especially acute when a statute seeks to distribute funding
or social services to a socioeconomically diverse set of beneficiaries
without privileging those in the wealthier end of the group.  If benefi-
ciaries with fewer financial resources consistently bring fewer claims
than their wealthier counterparts, relying heavily on private enforce-
ment may mean that the former group will not receive their fair share
of the distribution.  Reliance on private enforcement will thus unin-
tentionally undercut the statute’s substantive goals.
7 See, e.g., Melanie Natasha Henry, Comment, No Child Left Behind? Educational
Malpractice Litigation for the 21st Century, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1158–68 (2004) (advo-
cating private right of action and § 1983 suits for No Child Left Behind); Amy M.
Reichbach, Note, The Power Behind the Promise: Enforcing No Child Left Behind to Improve
Education, 45 B.C. L. REV. 667, 693–703 (2004) (discussing alternative theories for
private enforcement of No Child Left Behind).
8 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 64 (1996) (“[I]t is time to funda-
mentally rethink the necessity and proper role of the EEOC.  Whatever the EEOC’s
original mission, and whatever the original hope, today the agency is clearly a failure,
serving in some instances as little more than an administrative obstacle to resolution
of claims on the merits.”).
9 See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS 43–44 (1997) (describing
burdens).
10 See Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementa-
tion of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 27 n.144 (2001); Robert G. Schwemm, Private Enforcement and the
Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379–80 (1988); Selmi, supra note 8, at R
27–28 n.99; cf. Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 701, 720–24 (1977) (offering evidence that many potential consumer
complaints go unreported and exploring reasons why complaints are never
registered).
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This Article considers questions about the appropriate balance
between public and private enforcement in such a statutory scheme
through a case study of the federal special education law, the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).11  The IDEA requires that
states provide “appropriate” educational services to children with disa-
bilities, supplying some federal funding to help make this possible.12
It creates a host of private enforcement mechanisms, from administra-
tive hearings to lawsuits, as well as a system of public enforcement
through federal and state agencies.13  The statute is a universal rather
than a means-tested program, meaning that its benefits are intended
to extend to the wealthy and middle class as well as the poor.  It
explicitly announces its intention that resources under the statute are
to be distributed equitably, and it directs greater funding to states with
a higher share of poor children.14  Yet the evidence suggests that chil-
dren from wealthier families enforce their rights under the statute at
higher rates than do children in poverty15 and that this enforcement
disparity has a negative effect on the amount and quality of services
children in poverty actually receive.16  Part of the goal of this Article is
to explain how certain features of statutory design in the IDEA’s pri-
vate enforcement system lead to this result.
To study how institutional design choices may create and sustain
private enforcement disparities in distributional statutes is not to sug-
gest that such disparities do not exist in other types of statutes, nor is
it to suggest that the design features that may be particularly salient to
enforcement disparities in distributional statutes do not exist to some
degree in other types of statutes.  Yet because the federal government
uses distributional statutes to achieve a number of its policy goals—
especially in education, health, and other social welfare programs—it
is worthwhile to isolate the features of statutory design that lead to
enforcement disparities in those statutes, so that those who wish to
counter such disparities in distributional statutes understand which
statutory levers to adjust.
There is a growing literature on the problem of economic dispari-
ties in the implementation and enforcement of the IDEA.17  Chief
11 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
12 See infra Part I.A.
13 See infra Part I.A.
14 See infra Part I.C.
15 See infra Part I.B.
16 See infra Parts I.C, II.A–D.
17 See, e.g., MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 67–92 (1997)
(describing socioeconomic disparities in disability education programs); Daniela
Caruso, Bargaining and Distribution in Special Education, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
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among the concerns expressed in the literature is that wealthier par-
ents use the Act’s private enforcement mechanisms more than poor
parents do.  This is not a new concern.  Congress has amended the
private enforcement system over the years in attempts to make that
system more accessible to low-income families.  For example, prevail-
ing parents may recover attorneys’ fees, and alternative dispute resolu-
tion, which can be less expensive than adversarial lawsuits, is
encouraged.18  Contemporary scholarship largely focuses on addi-
tional ways to reform the private enforcement system to ensure that
poor families are not left behind, with comparatively little focus on
the ways that public enforcement can or should be reformed to
achieve this goal.19
The critical focus on private enforcement at the expense of pub-
lic enforcement may have a variety of explanations: it may grow out of
frustration that public enforcement of the IDEA has historically not
been vigorous,20 reluctance to introduce a note of class consciousness
171, 171–73 (2005); Thomas Hehir, Looking Forward: Toward a New Role in Promoting
Educational Equity for Students with Disabilities from Low-Income Backgrounds, in HAND-
BOOK OF EDUCATION POLICY RESEARCH 831, 836 (Gary Sykes et al. eds., 2009); Erin
Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special Education, 117
YALE L.J. 1802, 1836–37 (2008); Margaret M. Wakelin, Comment, Challenging Dispari-
ties in Special Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team Members to Ardent Advo-
cates, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 263, 269–71 (2008).
A parallel literature addresses the problem of racial disparities in special educa-
tion, including concerns about overrepresentation of minorities in certain disability
classifications and inappropriate provision of special education services to minorities.
See, e.g., BETH HARRY & JANETTE KLINGNER, WHY ARE SO MANY MINORITY STUDENTS IN
SPECIAL EDUCATION? (2006); COMM. ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN SPECIAL EDUC.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MINORITY STUDENTS IN SPECIAL AND GIFTED EDUCATION (M.
Suzanne Donovan & Christopher T. Cross eds., 2002); RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002); Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G.
Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive Legal Challenges to
Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 430 (2001).  The legal tool to remedy these disparities is Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006), which prohibits recipi-
ents of federal funding from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. See id.  The literature on economic and racial disparities raises overlapping
but not identical concerns.  I address only the former in this Article.
18 See infra Part I.B.
19 The focus on private enforcement is primary but not exclusive.  For example,
Hehir notes that greater state enforcement is necessary to effectuate the goals of the
statute for poor children, but does not go into much detail about what this enforce-
ment should look like. See Hehir, supra note 17, at 839.  Similarly, Caruso gestures R
toward the need for more public involvement but provides little in the way of specif-
ics. See Caruso, supra note 17, at 195–96. R
20 See infra Part IV.A.
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in the statutory framework to avoid the sense that it is a program for
the poor,21 or an understanding that private enforcement for wealth-
ier children will have positive externalities for poor children.22
Whatever the explanations, however, the almost exclusive focus on
private enforcement is a mistake.  As I argue below, certain design
features of the IDEA’s private enforcement mechanisms severely limit
their utility for children in poverty.  Because modifying these mecha-
nisms to address this problem is either normatively undesirable on
other grounds or politically implausible, there is a strong case to be
made for increased attention to public enforcement strategies.
The Article proceeds in five parts.  After briefly describing the
purpose of the IDEA and the structure of its enforcement mecha-
nisms, Part I discusses the evidence that there are disparities in the use
of the Act’s private enforcement mechanisms in favor of wealthier
families.  The existence of these disparities is often asserted as a mat-
ter of anecdote and theory, but this Part marshals the available empiri-
cal evidence to support this assertion.  This Part then explains why the
disparities are a problem.  The statute purports to distribute resources
in a way that is sensitive to children’s actual needs while blind to their
financial needs.  When poor children enforce their rights at lower
rates than wealthier children, the dynamics tend to lead to better ser-
vices for wealthier children.  This outcome runs counter to the stat-
ute’s distributional goals.
While Part I demonstrates that these are, in fact, the statute’s dis-
tributional goals, I do not in this Article attempt to justify these goals
as normatively correct.  My project instead is to highlight how a stat-
ute’s design choices in its enforcement regime may unintentionally
undercut its substantive distributional goals.  To that end, Part II
describes the elements of institutional design that contribute to the
problem of enforcement disparities: a universal rather than means-
tested program that relies on nontransparent, nonprecedential, pri-
vate bargaining over a highly individualized right to the provision of
social services, where the contours of the right are determined
through significant amounts of agency discretion.  This Part examines
the way that these features lead to informational asymmetries, nega-
tive externalities, and high transaction costs that make private
enforcement of the law comparatively difficult for families without
financial resources.  It also demonstrates why other elements of insti-
tutional design that have attempted to correct for these problems
have not done so.
21 See infra Part III.A.
22 See infra Part II.C.
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Part III reviews possible reforms to the Act’s private enforcement
mechanisms that other scholars and policymakers have suggested and
argues that they are insufficient for a host of structural as well as politi-
cal reasons.  In assessing the feasibility of reforms to the private
enforcement system, one of my goals is to maintain the political econ-
omy of the statute, which has long received support across party lines
and the socioeconomic spectrum.  I do not, therefore, consider mak-
ing the statute a means-tested program or eliminating the existence of
individual rights or private rights of action altogether, even though
these options would have the effect of eliminating class-based enforce-
ment disparities.  Following the literature suggesting that universal
programs can achieve more redistribution than means-tested pro-
grams, I reject reforms that would pit the wealthy against the poor.
This perspective also informs Part IV.  In that Part, I first justify a
greater role for public enforcement focusing on children in poverty in
light of the insufficiency of reforms to the IDEA’s private enforcement
system.  I then propose three types of reforms to the public enforce-
ment system: one based on informational regulation, one based on
monitoring and oversight, and one based on financial incentives.  I
attempt to show why each type of reform would improve enforcement
of the law for children in poverty and why the political economy of the
statute could support some version of each type of reform.
Part V explores lessons from this case study for allocating enforce-
ment responsibilities between public and private actors in distribu-
tional statutes more generally.  This Part first highlights other statutes
that share some of the features of the IDEA, for which similar types of
public enforcement may be helpful to support the statutes’ distribu-
tional goals.  This Part also observes that where public enforcement is
unlikely to be forthcoming in a given statutory scheme, adjusting the
statute’s other design features may reduce distributional problems.
This Part concludes by considering how such adjustments might work
in several specific instances.
I. THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITIES IN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE IDEA
A. The Legal Framework of the IDEA’s Enforcement System
The IDEA is the second largest federal program in education,
providing states and districts with approximately $12 billion each year
to serve about six million children with disabilities nationwide,
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roughly ten percent of all school-aged children.23  To be eligible for
service under the IDEA, a child must (1) be classified as having a stat-
utorily recognized disability and (2) need special education and
related services (such as various kinds of physical, occupational, medi-
cal, or psychological therapies) because of that disability.24  Together,
special education and related services define the Free and Appropri-
ate Public Education (FAPE) to which every child served by the IDEA
is entitled.25  What constitutes each child’s FAPE must be detailed in
an individualized education program (IEP), designed and updated
annually by a team of teachers, specialists, and the child’s parents.26
The statute requires that education for such children be provided in
the “least restrictive environment”27—that is, that children with disa-
bilities must be educated to the maximum extent possible with chil-
dren without disabilities.28  Other than this requirement, the statute
permits states, which in turn permit districts and schools, to design
23 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. III,
121 Stat. 1844, 2190–200 (2007) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.); 1 U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., 27TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2005, at xiv (2007).  Special, one-time
funding of $11.7 billion for IDEA came as part of the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1115, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of
U.S.C.), which was spread over fiscal years 2009 and 2010. See Alyson Klein, Guidelines
Sketch Out Use of Aid, EDUC. WK., Mar. 18, 2009, at 16.  Notwithstanding this federal
funding, states and districts continue to bear most costs of special education them-
selves (as they do the costs of education more generally). See Eloise Pasachoff, How
the Federal Government Can Improve School Financing Systems 4–5, 27–28 (Jan.
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
Fils/rc/papers/2008/01_education_pasachoff/01_education_paschoff.pdf.  Federal
funding for the IDEA is second only to federal funding for Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), which was reauthorized as the No
Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 20 U.S.C.).  Title I funds are directed toward children in poverty and
in fiscal year 2008 stood at $15.7 billion. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. III, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of U.S.C.).
24 See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A), (26), (29) (2006). See generally Cedar Rapids Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66, 68 n.1 (1999) (interpreting breadth of “related
services” provision).
25 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A)–(B), 1401(9), 1412(a)(1).
26 See id. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d).
27 Id. § 1412(a)(5).
28 See id.
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the substantive particulars of educational programs for children with
disabilities.29
The IDEA is often called “a model of cooperative federalism” for
the way it envisions the collaborative roles of the federal, state, and
local governments.30  The federal agency tasked with oversight over
the IDEA issues regulations;31 disburses funds to the states;32 reviews,
approves, and monitors state performance plans;33 provides technical
assistance;34 and, where it determines that a state is failing to comply
with the IDEA, takes enforcement action against the state, either by
moving to cut off its IDEA funds or to refer it to the Department of
Justice for litigation.35  For their part, states are responsible for gen-
eral supervision of all educational programs for children with disabili-
ties in the state36 and for monitoring the implementation of the IDEA
by school districts.37  In turn, school districts must comply with a vari-
ety of requirements in order to receive state and federal funds and are
primarily responsible for service delivery.38  No public actor is tasked
with reviewing on its own initiative the substance of individual chil-
dren’s IEPs.
It is the Act’s private enforcement system that takes on this role.
The IDEA is unusual among education programs created under the
framework of cooperative federalism in that it creates an individually
enforceable right to services.39  The provision of FAPE is an entitle-
29 Cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (stating that
the predecessor statute to IDEA “leaves to the States the primary responsibility for
developing and executing educational programs for handicapped children, [but]
imposes significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that
responsibility”).
30 See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 52 (2005) (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
31 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1402, 1406.
32 See id. § 1411.
33 Id. § 1416(a)–(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
34 Id. § 1417(a) (2006).
35 Id. § 1416(e) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
36 Id. § 1412(a)(11) (2006).
37 Id. § 1416 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
38 Id. § 1413 (2006).
39 By contrast, for example, there are no individual rights or private enforcement
mechanisms in No Child Left Behind.  Courts have further held that certain provi-
sions in No Child Left Behind permitting students in failing schools to transfer or to
receive supplemental educational services are not enforceable under § 1983. See
Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 269 F. Supp. 2d 338,
343–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Alliance for Children, Inc. v. City of Detroit Pub.
Schs., 475 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (holding that the No Child Left
Behind does not create a private right of action); Stokes v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No.
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ment, not merely a precatory goal.  Parents who wish to challenge a
substantive decision about their child’s IEP or the process by which it
was made may go through a formal state administrative process, called
a due process hearing.40  An impartial hearing officer presides over
the hearing, at which the parties have the right to be represented by
counsel, to present evidence, to cross-examine, and to compel the
attendance of witnesses.41  The results of the hearing may subse-
quently be disputed in state or federal court.42  Between 3000 and
7000 due process hearings are held each year, about 300 to 400 of
which annually proceed to litigation.43
In addition to requesting due process hearings, parents have two
other options for enforcing rights under the IDEA.44  First, they may
ask for mediation about any dispute with the school district regarding
their child’s special education services.45  A little over 4000 such medi-
ations are held each year.46  Second, they may file a complaint with
the state educational agency challenging some aspect of the provision
of special education services by the school, district, or state itself.47
The state educational agency must then investigate and resolve the
complaint in some way.48  Approximately 6000 state complaints are
05-11764-RWZ, 2006 WL 1892242, at *2 (D. Mass. July 10, 2006) (same); Fresh Start
Acad. v. Toledo Bd. of Educ., 363 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914–17 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (same).
40 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(g) (2006).
41 See id. § 1415(h).
42 See id. § 1415(i)(2).
43 See JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., REPORT 4: WHAT ARE
WE SPENDING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, 1999–2000?, at 8–9
(2003), available at http://www.csef-air.org/publications/seep/national/Procedu-
ral%20Safeguards.PDF; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-897, SPECIAL EDUCA-
TION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL DISPUTES ARE GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING
MEDIATION AND OTHER STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS 13–14 (2003).  Although
the numbers of due process hearings and court cases are small as a percentage of the
number of children receiving services under the IDEA, it is much larger than initially
anticipated, as the statute was expected to diminish the need to litigate over the rights
of children with disabilities. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES 135, 140,
158–59 (1994); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Where Have All the Lawsuits Gone?  The
Shockingly Small Role of the Courts in Implementing the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 08-12-05, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract/=1302085.
44 In Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 550 U.S. 516 (2007), the Supreme
Court held that parents themselves hold individually enforceable rights under the
IDEA. See id. at 535.
45 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e).
46 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43, at 15. R
47 See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151–.153 (2010).
48 See Id.
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filed annually.49  These three options—due process hearings, media-
tion, and state complaints—constitute the IDEA’s private enforce-
ment mechanisms.50
The individualized right and private enforcement mechanisms
are generally seen as important victories for the disability community,
allowing parents (and indeed disabled children themselves) a degree
of autonomy and control in the construction of their educational
experience.  However, as the next subpart demonstrates, there have
been unforeseen distributional consequences arising from this system
of private enforcement, making this victory decidedly less effective in
enforcing the statute overall.
B. Enforcement Disparities
Within the first ten years of the IDEA’s existence, a number of
studies found that wealthier families were the primary instigators of
due process proceedings, which were at that time the only private
enforcement option available in the statute.51  Since that time, a vari-
ety of statutory and regulatory changes have attempted to make the
system of private enforcement more accessible to low-income families.
First, in 1986, Congress provided that prevailing parents could
have the cost of their attorneys’ fees paid for by losing school dis-
tricts.52  Fee-shifting provisions are thought to level the playing field
49 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43, at 15. R
50 Some scholars would call the state complaint system a form of public enforce-
ment, treating as public enforcement anything that involves a government agency.
These scholars then differentiate between government action that involves processing
complaints made by private parties and government action that involves investigations
instigated without the involvement of private parties. See Selmi, supra note 5, at R
1411–23 (differentiating between individual complaints filed with the government
and complaints initiated as a result of government investigation).  It is this second
type of government action that I consider to be public enforcement in this Article
because filing a complaint with a government agency takes private initiative, much as
filing an administrative action or a lawsuit does.  Where the line between public and
private itself is drawn, however, is of less importance than the analysis of how the
actual mechanisms function with respect to private action and government action.
51 See, e.g., Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism to Collabo-
ration, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM 205, 214 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) (discussing
studies from early 1980s); David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Recon-
sidered: The Case of Special Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 343, 354 (David L.
Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986) (same).
52 See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100
Stat. 796 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006)).  The fee-shifting provi-
sion responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992
(1984), which held that the original IDEA legislation did not permit prevailing par-
ents to recover their attorneys’ fees, see id. at 1021.
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for individuals without financial resources, as they are designed to
encourage attorneys to take up the meritorious cases of plaintiffs,
especially those who would otherwise not be able to afford legal fees.53
Second, in 1997, Congress mandated that all states create a medi-
ation option separate from the due process proceeding, making a
national requirement out of a move that many states had already
made.54  This option, too, was designed in part to make the enforce-
ment system friendlier to low-income families, on the theory that a
less adversarial process would reduce the need for an attorney to
begin with.55
Third, the regulation creating the state complaint system was
modified in 199256 and again in 199957 to ensure that information
about the availability of that system was more widely disseminated, to
mandate that states solicit more information from the complainant
instead of simply adopting as findings the response of the com-
plained-about public actor, and to require states to respond to a com-
plaint not only by correcting the violation for the particular
complainant but also by extending the correction to any other chil-
dren the complaint might conceivably affect.58  These modifications
also had the potential to improve low-income children’s access to this
mechanism as well as the mechanism’s utility.
53 See, e.g., Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 1, at 1093–95 (describing advantages of R
fee-shifting provisions); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Thurgood Marshall, Meet Adam Smith:
How Fee-Shifting Statutes Provide a Market-Based System for Promoting Access to Justice
(Though Some Judges Don’t Get It) (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Working Paper Series, No. 150, John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 09-010, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 09-06-01, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407275
(same).
54 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2006).
55 See Jonathan A. Beyer, A Modest Proposal: Mediating IDEA Disputes Without Split-
ting the Baby, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 37, 41–48 (1999).
56 See Assistance to States for the Education of Students with Disabilities Program
and Preschool Grants for Children with Disabilities, 57 Fed. Reg. 44,794, 44,829
(Sept. 29, 1992) (current version at 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151–153 (2010)); Assistance to
States for Education of Handicapped Children, 56 Fed. Reg. 41,266 (proposed Aug.
19, 1991) (current version at 34 C.F.R. pt. 300).
57 See Assistance to States for the Education of Students with Disabilities and the
Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities, 64 Fed. Reg.
12,406, 12,413 (Mar. 12, 1999) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b)).
58 The earliest version of the state complaint system was located at 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.602(a) (1978) (current version at 34 C.F.R. § 300.151–.153).  For a brief his-
tory of state complaint procedure regulations, which remain surprisingly under-
studied, see Nicole Suchey & Dixie Snow Huefner, The State Complaint Procedure Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 64 J. EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 529 (1998).
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Notwithstanding these changes, the available evidence suggests
that wealthier parents continue to come out ahead in the enforce-
ment game.  At the individual and intradistrict level, the evidence is
largely anecdotal, but it is consistent and widespread.  Throughout
the country, scholars and commentators provide repeated examples
of parents with greater financial resources disproportionately taking
advantage of the IDEA’s private enforcement mechanisms in compari-
son to their less well-heeled neighbors.59  One small-scale study in
Maine confirmed these anecdotal reports, finding that families with
higher annual household income took advantage of the availability of
due process hearings and mediations more than lower-income fami-
lies did.60
More concrete empirical evidence exists of a wealth-based
interdistrict disparity in the use of the IDEA’s private enforcement
mechanisms.  According to a federally funded national study of due
process cases, mediations, and litigation (collectively labeled “proce-
dural activity”) in the 1999–2000 school year, districts serving families
with the highest median family income were more likely to have some
type of procedural activity than districts serving families with the mid-
dle or lowest median family income.61  For example, only four percent
of the lowest income and ten percent of middle-income districts had
due process hearings, while fifty-two percent of the highest income
districts did.62  Similarly, only nine percent of the lowest income and
59 See, e.g., JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN
DREAM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 140 (2003); KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17, at 77, R
87; Caruso, supra note 17, at 196; Rachel A. Holler & Perry A. Zirkel, Section 504 and R
Public Schools: A National Survey Concerning “Section 504-Only” Students, 92 NASSP BULL.
19, 23 (2008) (describing research on IDEA); Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Time
to Make Special Education Special Again, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW
CENTURY 23, 30–31 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. et al. eds., 2001); Daniel McGroarty, The
Little-Known Case of America’s Largest School Choice Program, in RETHINKING SPECIAL EDU-
CATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra, at 289, 293–94; Christine Gralow, The Special-Needs
Kindergarten Crunch, LESSON PLANS (Sept. 22, 2008, 9:09 PM), http://lessonplans.
blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/the-special-needs-kindergarten-crunch/?scp=1&sq=
special-needs+kindergartenrunch&st=cse&apage=1.
60 Michael J. Opuda, A Comparison of Parents Who Initiated Due Process Hear-
ings and Complaints in Maine 57–58, 92 (Nov. 17, 1997) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (on file with author).
61 CHAMBERS ET AL., supra note 43, at 14. R
62 Id.  The highest-income districts also had more litigations than districts in the
other income categories (five percent compared to two percent), but these results
were not statistically significant. Id.  This may be because of the relatively smaller
sample size of litigations (301 cases initiated and 293 cases ongoing in 1999–2000)
compared to mediations (4266) and due process cases (6763).  See id. at 8.
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five percent of the middle-income districts had any mediations, while
forty-three percent of the highest income districts did.63
It is unlikely that procedural activity in the highest income dis-
tricts is due to inferior educational services in those districts.  To the
contrary, the evidence suggests that wealthier districts both spend
more on and provide better special education services than less
wealthy districts do.64  Instead, as the authors of the study on procedu-
ral activity acknowledge, their findings are consistent with the idea
that families with more financial (and perhaps also educational)
resources are better situated to pursue their rights under the IDEA.65
63 Id. at 14.  There is much less disparity in the use of the state complaint system
between high- and low-income districts, and the disparity is not statistically significant.
Id. (finding thirty-five percent of lowest-income districts had state complaints, com-
pared to eighteen percent of middle-income districts and thirty-two percent of high-
est-income districts); cf. Opuda, supra note 60, at 57–58, 92 (finding that lower- R
income families file state complaints more than they request due process hearings).
Whatever the reason for this difference in utilization between the state complaint
system and other forms of private enforcement, there are nonetheless reasons to be
concerned about over relying on parents to file complaints. See infra Part II.
That families in low-income districts file state complaints at about the same rate
as families in high-income districts might be a result of the relative ease with which a
state complaint can be filed without the need for attorneys or an adversarial process.
However, mediation was also intended to be a less adversarial process without the
need for attorneys, and significant disparities exist in the use of that enforcement
mechanism.  It would be useful for future empirical research to compare the success
rate for families using each kind of private enforcement mechanism and to consider
whether there are class effects in any difference.
64 For example, a national study revealed that districts serving lower-income fami-
lies spend less, both in real and in cost-adjusted terms, per child with a disability than
do districts serving middle-income and wealthier families. JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL.,
CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., REPORT 2: HOW DOES SPENDING ON SPECIAL EDUCATION
VARY ACROSS DISTRICTS?, at iv, 7–8 (2002), available at http://www.csef-air.org/publi-
cations/seep/national/advRpt2.PDF.  A study of districts in Massachusetts found dis-
parities in special education services between low-income and high-income districts,
with students in low-income districts receiving later interventions, more segregated
classrooms, less access to the general curriculum, and higher staff-to-student ratios.
THOMAS HEHIR, NEW DIRECTIONS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 120–24 (2005).  Preliminary
results from a study of districts in California suggested that white, relatively privileged
students received more expensive, less restrictive special education services than their
poorer minority classmates did. KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17, at 75–82. R
65 See CHAMBERS ET AL., supra note 43, at 19.  Of course, because even districts R
with high median family incomes may serve poor children in addition to wealthy chil-
dren and because these data do not disaggregate district-level data down to individ-
ual-level data, it is theoretically possible that poor children in wealthy districts may be
enforcing their rights at the same rate as the wealthy children in those same districts.
That the available individual and intradistrict evidence supports the contrary story
suggests that this theoretical possibility does not reflect reality. See also infra Part II
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Just as there is evidence of intradistrict and interdistrict dispari-
ties in the use of the IDEA’s private enforcement mechanisms, so is
there evidence of interstate disparities, even when adjusting for the
number of children with disabilities within each state.  For example,
in 2006–2007, across all states and territories, there were 22.9 requests
for due process hearings per 10,000 children with a disability, but six
states had over thirty such requests per 10,000 children with a disabil-
ity while twenty-nine states had fewer than five such requests per
10,000 children with a disability.66  Similarly, nine states faced over
twenty mediation requests per 10,000 children with a disability while
thirty states faced under five such requests per 10,000 children with a
disability.67  Meanwhile, four states faced over twenty complaints per
10,000 children with a disability while nineteen states faced under five
complaints per 10,000 children with a disability.68
Further research and data analysis beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle are needed to disentangle the factors that explain this variation,
but several observations that raise some concerns are possible now.
First, states with more procedural activity do not seem to have services
or outcomes that are either noticeably better (a potential result of
more procedural activity) or noticeably worse (a potential cause of
more procedural activity) than states with less procedural activity.69
Second, especially with respect to requests for due process hearings
and mediations, there is a striking regional variation.  The states with
higher numbers tend to be in the Northeast and California, while the
states with fewer numbers tend to be in the Midwest, West, and
South.70  Third, this regional variation does not perfectly track child
poverty rates, but there is enough connection to be troubling.  Of the
(analyzing how design features of the IDEA’s private enforcement system privilege
wealthier families).
66 See Dick Zeller, Five Year State and National Summaries of Dispute Resolution Data,
CADRE, 28 (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/National
%20Part%20B%20Table%207%20Summary%20CADRE520Dec5202010.pdf.
67 See id. at 18.
68 See id. at 8.
69 See, e.g., 1 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 28TH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, 2006, at
205–18 tbls.3-1 to 3-8 (2009) (ranking states by measures such as percentage of stu-
dents with disabilities receiving regular high school diplomas, exiting high school by
dropping out, and receiving a high percentage of education in a more restrictive
environment than the regular classroom).
70 See Zeller, supra note 66, at 18, 28; cf. Kenneth R. Weiss, New Test-Taking Skill: R
Working the System, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at A1 (describing “high litigation corridor”
for special education issues between Boston, New York, and Washington, D.C., and in
wealthy communities in California, as compared to other regions).
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ten states with the lowest child poverty rates, four had twenty-eight or
more requests for due process hearings per 10,000 children with a
disability and another two had approximately nineteen or twenty such
requests,71 while of the ten states with the highest child poverty rates,
eight had under five such requests and another two had approxi-
mately seven or ten such requests.72
To be sure, the correlation between state child poverty rates and
requests for due process hearings is not perfect.  For example, Minne-
sota, Utah, and Colorado have low child poverty rates and low rates of
procedural activity, while New York and California have high child
poverty rates and high rates of procedural activity.73  A variety of fac-
tors other than poverty are likely at work in these regional variations.
These factors may include, among other things, heightened parental
71 The child poverty rates in rank order by state are available through the Annie
E. Casey Foundation using Census 2000 data. See Data Across States, KIDS COUNT DATA
CENTER, http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?1Oct=2&
by=a&order=a&ind=43&dfm=322&tf=38 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).  The four states
with twenty-eight or more due process hearing requests per 10,000 children with disa-
bilities in this low-poverty group are Connecticut (28.6 requests), Maryland (29.9
requests), Massachusetts (35.7 requests), and New Jersey (34.4 requests); New Hamp-
shire and Vermont, also in this low-poverty group, had 19.7 requests and 18.6
requests, respectively. See Zeller, supra note 66, at 28. R
72 The eight states in this high-poverty group with under five requests for due
process hearings per 10,000 children with disabilities are Mississippi (4.1 requests),
Louisiana (1.9), New Mexico (4.2), West Virginia (2.9), Arkansas (1.2), Kentucky
(2.3), Tennessee (4.0), and South Carolina (1.3); also in this high-poverty list, Texas
had 6.7 requests and Alabama had 9.7. See Zeller, supra note 66, at 28; Data Across R
States, supra note 71. R
73 See Zeller, supra note 66, at 28.  The District of Columbia is a dramatic outlier R
in this regard, as it has a greater percentage of child poverty than any state and yet is
off the charts with respect to due process hearings, holding over 1700 hearings per
10,000 children with a disability in 2006–2007, compared to 6.7 hearings per 10,000
children with a disability across all states and territories. See Zeller, supra note 66, at R
23; Data Across States, supra note 71.  The high rates of due process hearings in D.C. R
are generally understood to reflect that city’s broken special education system. See,
e.g., DC APPLESEED CTR. & PIPER RUDNICK LLP, A TIME FOR ACTION (2004), available at
http://www.dcappleseed.org/library/Special_ed_Rprt.pdf.  Notwithstanding D.C.’s
high rates of private enforcement overall, concerns about enforcement disparities
between poor and wealthier children continue to exist.  In 1999, Congress placed a
cap on the amount of attorneys’ fees prevailing parents in special education cases in
D.C. could receive from the school district.  This limitation makes it more difficult for
poor families who cannot afford to pay lawyers’ fees to bring IDEA cases. See Lynn M.
Daggett, Special Education Attorney’s Fees: Of Buckhannon, the IDEA Reauthorization Bills,
and the IDEA as Civil Rights Statute, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 47–50 (2004);
McGroarty, supra note 59, at 306 & n.15 (describing two “separate and unequal” spe- R
cial education systems in D.C. varying largely by parental wealth).  I discuss the useful-
ness of the IDEA’s attorneys’ fees provision more generally in Part II.C.
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expectations about schooling in general and special education ser-
vices in particular in certain areas; cultural norms about when it is
appropriate to challenge educational authorities, norms that may
become replicated through social networks in a region;74 and states’
different approaches to IDEA dispute resolution.75
While the various contributing factors are complicated to unpack,
and further empirical work remains to be done, the available evidence
suggests that the disparate use of the IDEA’s private enforcement
mechanisms is less connected to substantive differences between spe-
cial education services in each state or district than it is to student and
family demographic factors that should be irrelevant to enforcement
efforts defined by need.76  The question thus becomes whether and
why these enforcement disparities matter.
C. Why Enforcement Disparities Matter
The wealth-based disparities in private enforcement raise troub-
ling questions about the IDEA’s effectiveness for children in poverty.
Nothing in the statute suggests that it is intended to privilege compar-
atively wealthy children.  To the contrary, while the statute is a univer-
sal rather than a means-tested program, its intent to pay particular
attention to traditionally disadvantaged populations is clear.  As a mat-
ter of history, the statute grew out of lawsuits brought by civil rights
attorneys and poverty lawyers, who went on to be instrumental in
drafting the original statutory provisions in ways that they thought
would benefit their clients.77  The current statutory text reflects this
early concern.  For example, the statute declares “equitable allocation
of resources” as one of its central goals in light of “the Federal Gov-
ernment[’s] . . . responsibility to provide an equal educational oppor-
tunity for all individuals.”78  It singles out for special efforts minority
74 See infra Part II.C.
75 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43, at 16–21 (discussing R
different approaches to dispute resolution among states); KELLY HENDERSON, NAT’L
ASS’N OF STATE DIRS. OF SPECIAL EDUC., OPTIONAL IDEA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION (2008), available at http://www.directionservice.org/cadre/pdf/optional%20
IDEA%20Alternative%20Dispute%20Resolution.pdf (same); JOY MARKOWITZ ET AL.,
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE DIRS. OF SPECIAL EDUC., DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2003), available at
http://www.projectforum.org/docs/dispute_resolution.pdf (same).
76 Cf. Zeller, supra note 66, at iv (noting that it is “unlikely that these variations R
result solely from real differences in educational programs across these states”).
77 See MELNICK, supra note 43, at 144, 155–56; MARTHA MINOW, IN BROWN’S WAKE: R
LEGACIES OF AMERICA’S EDUCATIONAL LANDMARK 74 (2010).
78 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(7) (2006); see also id. § 1400(c)(1) (“Improving educa-
tional results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our national pol-
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children with disabilities and those whose first language is something
other than English.79  It directs greater federal funding to states with a
higher share of poor children.80  And Congress and the implementing
federal agency have continually revised the statute’s private enforce-
ment mechanisms in an (albeit unsuccessful) effort to make them
more accessible to families without means.81  Yet because of the stat-
ute’s heavy reliance on private enforcement, and because private
enforcement of the IDEA continues to be skewed in favor of wealthier
families, the IDEA’s enforcement regime is at cross-purposes with rest
of the statute.82
The disparities in the enforcement of the IDEA are a signal of a
still larger problem: disparities in the quality of special education pro-
grams provided to children in poverty.  Simply put, and as described
further in Part II of this Article, wealthier parents of children with
disabilities are able to use the private enforcement system or the
threat (whether implicit or explicit) of private enforcement to obtain
superior services and more ambitious IEPs.83  While the causal link
between educational inputs and educational outcomes is notoriously
difficult to pinpoint with precision,84 there is reason to believe that
the superior services provided to wealthier children with disabilities
has had a real effect over time.  A national study comparing outcomes
icy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.”).
79 See id. § 1400(c)(10)–(13); see also infra notes 264–268 and accompanying text R
(describing requirements for addressing racial disparities in special education
services).
80 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2), (d)(3)(A).
81 See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. R
82 A funding regime that privileges wealthier children is also at cross-purposes
with much of the rest of federal education spending.  For example, one of the pur-
poses of No Child Left Behind was to “clos[e] the achievement gap . . . between
disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers” by, for example, “distribut-
ing and targeting resources sufficiently to make a difference to local educational
agencies and schools where needs are greatest.”  20 U.S.C. § 6301(3), (5).  Some fed-
eral education funding is specifically designed to encourage states to create school
finance systems that do not permit great spending disparities between poor and
wealthy districts. See, e.g., id. § 6337(b) (describing process for distributing Education
Finance Incentive Grant funds based upon a state’s “fiscal effort and equity”); id.
§ 7709(b)(1) (encouraging “state equalization plans” under Impact Aid funding).
Further, the federal Department of Education has recently established an Equity and
Excellence Commission to consider “how the Federal government can increase edu-
cational opportunity by improving school funding equity.” See Equity and Excellence
Commission, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,661 (Aug. 11, 2010).
83 See infra Part II.
84 See Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73
ECONOMETRICA 417, 440–41 (2005).
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of students with disabilities in the mid-1980s with outcomes of stu-
dents with disabilities in the early 2000s found that the impressive
gains of this population overall were largely due to improved out-
comes for children living in middle-income and upper-income
homes.85  In contrast, outcomes for children living in lower-income
homes showed virtually no improvement.86  This disparity is not attrib-
utable merely to differential services offered by wealthy and less
wealthy districts, for even low-income children with disabilities who
attended schools in relatively well-off districts still showed little
improvement in outcomes over time.87  The results of this study
underscore two important points: that federal mandates matter and
that the way federal mandates are implemented, including enforce-
ment efforts, is critically important.
The wealth disparity in private IDEA enforcement is particularly
disturbing because children with disabilities are more likely to live in
poverty than children in the general population are.  Data from the
early 2000s shows that twenty-one percent of elementary- and middle-
school students with disabilities live in poverty, compared to sixteen
percent of children in the general population.88  Thirty-seven percent
of secondary-school students with disabilities live in households with
family incomes of $25,000 or less, compared to twenty percent of chil-
dren in the general population.89  The numbers are even more strik-
ing when race is factored in: more than half of African-American and
Hispanic secondary-school students with disabilities live in households
with family incomes of $25,000 or less, compared with twenty-five per-
cent of white secondary-school students with disabilities.90  If the
IDEA’s private enforcement regime is insufficiently accounting for the
needs of these students, large numbers indeed of the IDEA’s intended
beneficiaries are not being appropriately served.
85 See Hehir, supra note 17, at 831–33; see also HEHIR, supra note 64, at 120–24 R
(describing a Massachusetts study finding that the majority of disabled students in
high-income districts, who had received superior services, passed the state exit exam,
while the majority of disabled students in low-income districts failed it).
86 See Hehir, supra note 17, at 831–33. R
87 See id. at 836.
88 Jose Blackorby & Mary Wagner, As Time Goes By: Short-Term Changes in the Exper-
iences of Elementary and Middle School Students with Disabilities, in SEELS: WAVE 1 WAVE 2
OVERVIEW 1-1, 1-2 to 1-5 (2004), available at http://www.seels.net/designdocs/w1w2/
SEELS_W1W2_complete_report.pdf.
89 Mary Wagner et al., Who Are Secondary Students in Special Education Today?, 2
NLTS2 DATA BRIEF 1, 2 (2003), available at http://www.ncset.org/publications/nlts2/
NCSETNLTS2Brief_2.1.pdf.
90 See id.
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It is useful to unpack the problem underlying the enforcement
disparity a little more closely at this stage.  There are at least two possi-
ble ways the enforcement disparity could affect the substance of the
education provided to poor children with disabilities.  First, the prob-
lem could be an absolute one: poor children could be receiving an
amount or quality of service that is inadequate as measured against
some minimum statutorily acceptable baseline, regardless of what
wealthier children are receiving.  Alternatively, the problem could be
a comparative one: poor children could be receiving less than wealth-
ier children do in terms of the amount or quality of service, even
though the amount or quality poor children receive does not on its
own violate the terms of the statute.  To use the language of school
finance litigation, the first problem is one of adequacy, while the sec-
ond problem is one of equity.91
However, as the literature on school finance increasingly recog-
nizes, the distinction between adequacy and equity is not as clear as it
is sometimes made to seem.  As James Ryan explains, “there is not a
clear divide between equity and adequacy cases for the simple reason
that courts in all cases tend to converge around the goal of rough
comparability.”92  In school finance cases brought under equity theo-
ries, “courts rarely require complete equality of resources” but instead
something more like “‘substantial’ equality.”93  In turn, in school
finance cases brought under adequacy theories, courts “typically
define adequacy in comparative terms and remain focused on
resource disparities.”94  The connection between equity and adequacy
concepts makes sense to the extent that education is in part a “posi-
tional good”: one whose value depends on the extent of what others
91 See generally William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Ken-
tucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219 (1990) (detailing the first two waves of school finance reform and predict-
ing a new, third wave).
92 JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 150 (2010); see also Richard
Briffault, Adding Adequacy to Equity, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS 25, 27, 47 (Martin R.
West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (describing “interconnectedness” of adequacy
and equity theories in school finance reform); Aaron Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of
the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 895–96 (2006) (observing that “ade-
quacy is a fuzzy concept not at all distinct from equality,” because what is adequate “is
not an objective question” but one to be determined in part by reviewing what well-
financed, high-performing schools propose and achieve).
93 RYAN, supra note 92, at 150. R
94 Id.
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possess.95  In other words, because the quality of one’s elementary and
secondary education permits one to compete, to varying degrees, in
the labor market and in admission to post-secondary education, it is
difficult to define what an acceptable bare minimum should be with-
out considering what one’s future competitors will have received.96
Just as in the school finance litigation context, a focus on the ade-
quacy of education for poor children with disabilities is thus implicitly
connected to equity with the education for wealthier children with
disabilities.
But even if adequacy and equity could be cleanly separated in the
case of the IDEA, both issues are important.  On the one hand, if poor
children are not receiving the minimally “appropriate” individualized
services that the statute mandates, then the IDEA is failing to achieve
its goals for this set of intended beneficiaries.  On the other hand,
when a wealthier child receives superior services to what his otherwise
similarly situated poor neighbor receives simply because his parents
have relied on the private enforcement system to their advantage, it
gives the appearance that what is legally “appropriate” for a given
child is connected to familial income.  Nothing in the statute indicates
that this is a desired result.
How are these disparities different from others?  American law
and policy allow a great deal of wealth-based inequity in both educa-
tion and access to justice, after all.  For example, parents have a consti-
tutional right to send their children to private school,97 and the
federal Constitution both permits funding disparities between school
districts98 and treats the line between suburban and urban school dis-
tricts as largely inviolable by federal intervention.99  Further, while
indigent criminal defendants have a constitutional right to an attor-
ney provided at public expense,100 no law forbids wealthy criminal
defendants from purchasing superior legal services, and no law
requires public funding for an attorney for indigent civil litigants at
all.  These regimes all privilege the wealthy.
What concerns me here, however, is a wealth-based disparity of a
fundamentally different nature.  I consider not an abstract, moral
95 See id. at 151; William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat
from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 595–604
(2006).
96 See RYAN, supra note 92, at 15; Koski & Reich, supra note 95, at 597–603. R
97 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
98 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55 (1973).
99 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974); see also RYAN, supra note 92, at R
63–117.
100 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
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question about the appropriate components of the social contract for
children with disabilities,101 but a narrower question about the distri-
bution of public moneys in the context of a statute that does not pur-
port to give more to the wealthy.  My frame is not the philosophical
consideration of whether or why this statutory goal is correct but
instead the technical one of how to implement this spending statute
according to its terms.102  The IDEA does not mean to privilege
wealthier children in its distribution of taxpayer dollars.  It is there-
fore worthwhile to study the statutory design choices that unintention-
ally lead to this result.
II. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND DISPARITIES IN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE IDEA
A. Institutional Design
Daniela Caruso helpfully articulates certain elements of institu-
tional design that lead to distributional problems in the implementa-
tion of the IDEA: the primacy placed on parental involvement in the
construction of IEPs for each student, which Caruso describes as the
bargaining mechanisms at the core of the statute;103 the wide agency
discretion of the school system in proposing appropriate services;104
the lack of transparency, both in the negotiations over these services
and in the resulting IEPs;105 and the federal/state/local funding struc-
ture that results in budget constraints limiting districts’ ability to pro-
vide all children with all the services they desire.106  I would add one
more element of institutional design to this list: the construction of
the right at an individualized level, as opposed to a generalized right
similar to the rights provided by the education clauses in state consti-
tutions (entitling children to, for example, a “thorough and efficient
public education”),107 or those protected by the line of cases stem-
101 Others have explored variations on this important question with great care.
For example, Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester have asked on what moral basis it
makes sense for public policy to prioritize middle-class children with learning disabili-
ties over poor children without learning disabilities but with generally poor school
performance. See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17, at 218–19. R
102 Cf. Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 YALE J.
ON REG. 167, 167 n.1 (1985) (defining an efficient regulation as “one that obtains the
social goal established by policymakers and does so at the least cost” (emphasis added)).
103 Caruso, supra note 17, at 172. R
104 Id. at 172, 187–88, 190–92.
105 Id. at 172, 187.
106 Id. at 172, 190–92.
107 See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Liti-
gation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 320–26 (1991).
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ming from Brown v. Board of Education108 (entitling children to attend
schools that do not segregate).109
All of these features have much to commend them in the
abstract.  For example, the bargaining mechanisms may empower par-
ents to become involved in their child’s education, and, as Caruso
notes, are “in principle status-blind.”110  Agency discretion, as opposed
to a grid or handbook of permitted options, may ensure that the indi-
vidual needs of any given child are met and may also reflect a valuable
commitment to the diversity that educational federalism brings.111
The individualized right may be important because different children
with the same disability can have different needs.112  Finally, the lack
of transparency may ensure privacy in a sensitive area.113
But at the same time, these features interact to result in distribu-
tional problems that disfavor poor families.  As Caruso explains, par-
ents with more financial and educational resources have greater
bargaining power to obtain IEPs that provide more educational bene-
fits.114  These parents know the types of services they want and will
fight to have them provided, whether in the public school system or
through a private placement supplied at public expense, using lawyers
and experts.115  The resulting IEPs will provide more services than the
districts would originally have provided in the absence of parental
demands.116  This negotiation produces an IEP that is much closer to
a contract—the consideration for which is the parents’ agreement not
to sue during the term of the IEP—than an IEP agreed to by parents
with fewer financial and educational resources.117  For these other
parents, who by and large are unaware of the services in IEPs for
wealthier children and of their rights under the statute, it is more
common to accept the districts’ proposed IEPs, regardless of their
adequacy, without making additional demands.118  These IEPs will
108 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109 See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement
Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1660–67 (2007).
110 Caruso, supra note 17, at 180. R
111 See id. at 187–88; cf. MELNICK, supra note 43, at 179 (describing the different R
level of discretion in welfare structure).
112 Caruso, supra note 17, at 187–88. R
113 See id. at 187.
114 See id. at 178.
115 See id. at 179.
116 See id.
117 See id. at 178–80; see also Hehir, supra note 17, at 836 (noting that many mid- R
dle- and upper-income parents use the threat of due process hearings to obtain better
services).
118 See Caruso, supra note 17, at 178. R
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include services that may (but may not) comply with the IDEA’s FAPE
requirement, but they will also be affected by the districts’ financial
needs.119  Far from a contract with bilateral agreement and considera-
tion, these IEPs will reflect the parents’ acceptance of social services as
they would accept any other government benefit.120
These distributional problems evident at the time at which IEPs
are constructed are then compounded by the way these design fea-
tures interact in the use of the IDEA’s private enforcement mecha-
nisms.  In the rest of this Part, I show how these design features create
information asymmetries, limited positive externalities with a strong
potential for negative externalities, and high transaction costs that
together limit the utility of the IDEA’s private enforcement mecha-
nisms for children in poverty.  As I discuss each of these problems, I
also show how certain attempts to counter these problems by rede-
signing elements of the law have not succeeded.
B. Information Asymmetries
The private bargaining mechanisms surrounding the individual-
ized right combine with the discretion and lack of transparency to
produce information asymmetries, both among parents and between
parents and schools, with particularly negative ramifications for poor
families.121  Consider the confidential nature of IEP proceedings.122
Because there are no public records of the services a disabled child
receives, it is hard for an unknowledgeable parent to determine the
universe of services to ask for.  Indeed, courts have held that knowl-
edge of other students’ IEP services is irrelevant to the FAPE determi-
nation for any given child, denying parents’ discovery requests for
such information.123  If there is no public information on services,
parents are left to call on their own informational networks to deter-
mine what services to ask for and when bringing a claim is necessary to
enforce their rights effectively.
119 See id. at 178–79.
120 See id. at 179.
121 There may also be information asymmetries among schools, as schools that do
not intend to provide inferior services to children in poverty may do so because of a
lack of information of how other schools address certain needs in a more fulsome
way.
122 Caruso, supra note 17, at 187–88. R
123 Hupp v. Switz. of Ohio Local Sch. Dist., No 2:07-CV-628, 2008 WL 2323783, at
*2–3 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2008).
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Studies have shown that parents in poverty have less knowledge in
this regard.124  Why is this?  Wealthier parents tend to have broader
social networks with more varied geographical range, so they can find
out the best services offered to other children with the same set of
disabilities no matter where they are located in the country.  They also
tend to have a social network that is in the same socioeconomic range,
so the information they glean will be information supported by the
bargaining weight of other families who are similarly well off.125  In
contrast, the informational networks of poor families tend to be more
limited in geographical scope, while the fact that these networks tend
to be limited to the same socioeconomic range means that the infor-
mation provided will not be filtered through bargaining power.126
Wealthier families thus come out ahead in the informational game.
As for informational asymmetries between parents and schools,
poor families are once again at a disadvantage.  Schools are repeat
players in the IEP game with all of the resources and accumulated
expertise that that entails.127  Parents, meanwhile, have only their own
child, and while they have the right to engage with the school in each
year’s IEP meeting to discuss the appropriate level and type of ser-
vices, each year’s IEP will likely use the previous year’s as an anchor
against which adjustments will be made.128  The school’s initial
greater informational advantage therefore pervades all future interac-
124 For example, one study found that while low-income parents were concerned
about their children’s education, they had little awareness of the particular disability
classification assigned to their child; were not aware of the types of services that might
be available to their child; and neither knew the formal terms of the statute (such as
“due process,” “least restrictive environment,” or “mainstreaming”) nor recognized
the concepts when explained to them. See Ellen Anderson Brantlinger, Making Deci-
sions About Special Education Placement: Do Low-Income Parents Have the Information They
Need?, 20 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 94, 96–98 (1987).  Another study found that
mothers who were welfare recipients tended not to understand the rights afforded to
them under the IDEA, instead uncritically accepting the programs offered to their
disabled children by their schools. See N. Kagendo Mutua, Policed Identities: Children
with Disabilities, 32 EDUC. STUDIES 289, 292–93, 295 (2001).  While these parents may
be well intentioned and involved, they are unlikely to press for better services or to
raise claims about insufficient IEPs.
125 See JOHN FIELD, SOCIAL CAPITAL 82–91 (2d ed. 2008).
126 See id.
127 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (describing limitations of using
the legal system as a means of redistribution).
128 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 23–24 (2008) (discussing
the dangers associated with the common process of “anchoring and adjustment”
because of the ease with which “obviously irrelevant anchors creep into the decision-
making process” and because “adjustments are typically insufficient”).
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tions.  To the extent that wealthier parents can use their networks to
counter the school’s informational advantage more easily than poor
families can, poor families will suffer more from the school’s advan-
tage.  In turn, these informational asymmetries mean that it can be
more difficult for low-income families to recognize when their IDEA
rights have been violated by inadequate IEPs, and accordingly it can
make them less likely to pursue private enforcement actions.
The law includes a variety of mechanisms to counter these infor-
mational asymmetries.  For example, Parent Information Centers
receiving federal assistance in each state are required by statute to
provide information on services and advocacy.129  Attorneys’ fees are
available to prevailing parties to make it more possible for families
without financial resources to find an attorney to represent them,130
as attorneys, particularly specialists who themselves are repeat players,
can counter the school’s informational advantage.  These resources
are important and necessary, but they do not sufficiently undercut the
existence or effect of the informational asymmetries.
First, the information provided through Parent Information Cen-
ters (or informal, parent-run informational websites) is not generally
translated into what services look like on real IEPs.131  Poor families
are less well situated to wade through the available information to
work this out, while Parent Information Centers are at a structural
disadvantage in gathering sufficiently detailed and varied data on the
substance of IEPs, without any authority to require schools or families
to share this sensitive information with the public at large.  Second,
because poor families tend to be less aware of their rights under the
IDEA and of the meaning of particular diagnoses, they are thus less
129 20 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (2006).  Parent-run websites also proliferate in this space
to supplement the more formal centers.  One of the most prominent is Wrightslaw.
See generally WRIGHTSLAW, http://www.wrightslaw.com (last visited June 13, 2011)
(“Parents, educators, advocates, and attorneys come to Wrightslaw for accurate, relia-
ble information about special education law, education law, and advocacy for children
with disabilities.”).
130 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Fee-shifting provisions are designed to encourage
attorneys to take up the meritorious cases of plaintiffs, especially those who would
otherwise not be able to afford legal fees, under statutes for which private enforce-
ment is important to vindicate the public interest. See, e.g., Albiston & Nielsen, supra
note 1, at 1088, 1093–95. R
131 The brochures available from the Wyoming Parent Information Center are typ-
ical. See Publications, PARENT INFO. CENTER, http://www.wpic.org/publications.html
(last visited June 13, 2011).  They describe a typical diagnosis for a variety of disabili-
ties and suggest a few strategies for parents, but they do not give a sense of the range
of accommodations and services that children have received from local schools.
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likely to pursue this information to begin with.132  Third, as I will dis-
cuss in more detail below, there are a variety of structural impedi-
ments to relying on the fee-shifting provision to ensure that families
without financial resources can find an attorney, not least of which is
that attorneys’ fees are available only to prevailing parties, so there is a
financial risk to pursuing representation.133  Notwithstanding these
resources, then, informational asymmetries continue to exist in
practice.
C. Externalities
Information asymmetries would matter less if there were positive
externalities from wealthier children’s use of private enforcement
mechanisms.  Indeed, the class-based enforcement disparities would
be less problematic overall if poor children benefitted from the
enforcement actions of wealthier families.  Thomas Hehir has fre-
quently argued that these externalities exist, explaining that as some
parents advocate for their rights under the law, school administrators
begin to change practices system-wide, benefitting even those students
whose parents did not or could not advocate for them.134
While poor children undoubtedly benefit from private enforce-
ment that leads to expansive interpretation of legal principles under
the IDEA, the argument for the existence of positive externalities
should not be overstated, as Hehir himself at times acknowledges.135
In contrast to the school finance cases or school segregation cases,
where one person’s enforcement of her right to attend a school that is
funded properly or not segregated improperly effectuates the full
extent of that right both for her and for her classmates, much enforce-
ment of IDEA rights involves rights that are unique to an individual
and therefore does little to affect the education of another child.  The
subject of many private enforcement actions is the specific assortment
of services that should be in a particular child’s IEP.136  When a
wealthier child prevails in a private enforcement action, she may sim-
ply receive the services she desires (or reimbursement for having
132 See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text. R
133 See infra Part II.D.
134 See Hehir, supra note 17, at 836; Hehir & Gamm, supra note 51, at 214–16; R
Thomas Hehir, The Impact of Due Process on the Programmatic Decisions of Special
Education Directors (1990) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on
file with author).  Hehir makes the point with reference to due process proceedings
but the rationale behind this theory could apply to remedies stemming from state
complaints and mediations as well.
135 See Hehir, supra note 17, at 836; Hehir, supra note 134, at 44. R
136 See Caruso, supra note 17, at 182. R
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obtained those services privately) without giving any of her disabled
classmates access to those services as well and without setting any
enforceable precedent for those who might follow her.
In addition, the theory behind positive externalities in this con-
text relies on the idea that administrators may change practices
because they are concerned about avoiding a due process challenge
or other private enforcement action.137  But if the likelihood is slim
that a family in a particular demographic will bring a private enforce-
ment action, a school district has little incentive to change its practices
in advance.  Similarly, the argument in support of positive externali-
ties does not stand in the vast majority of states, where the chance of
private enforcement is minimal.138  The problem of informational
asymmetries helps limit the possibility of positive externalities.  Where
parents do not know what services other children are receiving, there
is less chance of relying on one family’s successes to the benefit of
another family, as well as less chance that school administrators will
consistently feel pressure to make broader change.139  Because poor
children are unlikely to reap the benefits of wealthier children’s reme-
dies, enforcement disparities matter.
In turn, the enforcement disparities contribute to several differ-
ent negative externalities.  First, at the district level, when wealthier
parents obtain services for their children that translate into more
money, there is less money available for poor children with disabili-
ties.140  Districts may consider costs when choosing among appropri-
ate options for a child with disabilities.141  When facing choices
137 See Hehir & Gamm, supra note 51, at 215; Neal & Kirp, supra note 51, at 354 R
(discussing the value of bargaining in the “shadow of the law”); see also Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 966 (1979) (describing a similar theory of bargaining in the context
of divorce).
138 Hehir acknowledged this limitation in his early work. See Hehir, supra note
134, at 44 (“It is doubtful that due process has as much impact on the programs in R
states where it is seldom used.”).
139 Administrators may also feel that an appropriate public education for a given
child depends to some extent on the resources the family itself can provide, again
making it less likely that the individual-focused advocacy of wealthy parents will trickle
down to lower-income children with disabilities. See, e.g., HEHIR, supra note 64, at R
59–60 (advocating that special education administrators take into account family
capacity and desires in making decisions).
140 See Caruso, supra note 17, at 182.  For example, the more wealthy parents who R
obtain reimbursement for private school tuition or coveted slots in classrooms with
low teacher-student ratios, the less money in the system to provide other children with
special education services. See Hehir, supra note 17, at 836. R
141 See Jay P. Heubert, Schools Without Rules?  Charter Schools, Federal Disability Law,
and the Paradoxes of Deregulation, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 321 (1997).
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among possible programs for a wealthy child and a poor child, dis-
tricts have an incentive to acquiesce to the more expensive requests of
the former and to provide the less expensive option to the latter, since
the risk of a private enforcement action is greater with wealthier
families.
Similarly, individual actions by wealthier children may result in
judicial decisions or settlements that are contrary to the interests of
children in poverty.142  For example, wealthier parents may use the
private enforcement options to obtain private school placement at
public expense.143  These families will then have little reason to work
to improve the local public school system more generally, although
there is evidence that the presence of families with greater financial
resources plays an important role in ensuring school quality.144
Finally, to the extent that the enforcement disparity contributes
to worse service provision to poor children, which then contributes to
worse outcomes (fewer high school diplomas, worse test scores, and
the like), society bears the consequences.  These consequences
include financial ones, such as lower tax revenues and greater cost of
social services as this group progresses through life after school,145 as
well as moral ones, such as concern about equal educational opportu-
nity for this group.146
The state complaint system attempts to counter the problem of
externalities by requiring that any time the state agency resolves a
complaint by finding a failure to provide appropriate services, the
written decision must address not only corrective action as to the par-
ticular child but also “[a]ppropriate future provision of services for all
children with disabilities.”147  But where the complaint addresses the
narrow set of appropriate services for the child who filed it, there are
142 Cf. LANDSBERG, supra note 9, at 46, 118 (noting that one potential problem R
with private enforcement is its focus on vindication of private interests that may be
contrary to a broader public interest).
143 See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2492 (2009); Florence Cnty.
Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 9–10 (1993); Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471
U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
144 See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW (2001) (arguing that
poor children do better academically in schools that are socioeconomically integrated
and that public school choice is the best path to achieve such integration).
145 Cf. HENRY LEVIN ET AL., THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION
FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2 (2007) (estimating “the additional tax revenues
and reductions in the cost of public health, criminal justice, and welfare associated
with” an increase in the high school graduation rate).
146 See generally HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 59 (examining the Ameri- R
can dream of education and the dilemmas created by that dream).
147 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b) (2010).
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limited possibilities for extending the results of the complaint more
broadly.  Where the complaint addresses a systemic problem, there is
a greater potential to affect children beyond the complainant, to be
sure; but even here, the individual needs of poor children will often
not be affected.  For example, a systemic complaint that seeks to
ensure that a district processes requests for due process hearings in a
timely way will have a broader benefit, but it will affect only those chil-
dren who request due process hearings in the first instance, and does
not address the greater ability of the wealthier child to bargain his way
to better individualized services overall.  Class actions, which I discuss
at more length in subpart III.D below, suffer from a similar problem.
Neither the state complaint system nor class actions can sufficiently
offset the issue of externalities.
D. Transaction Costs
One could argue that dependence on an aggrieved individual to
bring a claim produces a socially efficient level of enforcement, as the
expected value of the remedy would have to exceed the individual’s
cost of complaining.148  But where the transaction costs associated
with bringing a claim are high and are unevenly spread throughout
the affected population, an enforcement system that relies too heavily
on private individuals to raise claims likely fails to capture the spec-
trum of harms that the public policy in question seeks to remedy.  At
least four such transaction costs result in enforcement disparities that
are anything but socially efficient when viewed against the goals of the
IDEA.
The first type of transaction cost is the cost of involvement in edu-
cational decisions.  This cost is more expensive for parents with fewer
financial resources, both in the cost of obtaining sufficient knowledge
to participate in these decisions149 and in the comparative cost of los-
ing time at work to participate in these decisions.150  Relying on par-
ents to raise claims will therefore not produce socially efficient results
because this reliance privileges the children of parents who can more
easily afford to be more engaged with their education.151
148 See Selmi, supra note 8, at 28. R
149 See supra Part II.B.
150 See ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT 10–11 (2004).
151 The concern is similar to the concern raised by opponents of school vouchers
about “skimming,” where the children of the most involved low-income families will
be the ones who get vouchers, leaving children of less involved families in ever-wors-
ening public schools. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of
School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2092 (2002) (“[I]f more families are empowered to
choose among education options, the most well-informed, motivated, and economi-
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The second type of transaction cost is the risk involved in raising
a claim, which varies with the ease of exiting the school system.152
These risks are also connected to class and geographical disparities.
Wealthier families are better able to raise individual claims because
they can more easily move to a different district or into private school
if the relationship with the school is harmed in the process of com-
plaining, while lower-income parents have fewer such options.153  Sim-
ilarly, where exit is less possible for geographic reasons, such as in
districts that cover a wide area with limited private options, there may
be more risks in raising complaints.
The third type of transaction cost is the cost of losing standing in
one’s community, which involves the extent to which social and cul-
tural norms support or undercut the raising of claims.  Different
regions may have different cultural expectations around bringing
complaints that may lead to variations in enforcement that are uncon-
nected to any differences in substantive wrongs.154  For example, the
Northeast and California may face disproportionate numbers of com-
plaints because it may be more culturally acceptable to file complaints
there than in other areas of the country.155  Similarly, certain districts
may get a reputation for providing excellent services so knowledgea-
ble parents flock there and then pursue their rights to the fullest
extent.156  There may also be some social sets in which parents try to
obtain certain accommodations or services that they know their
child’s peers have obtained in an effort to ensure that their child is
cally well-off families are more likely to avail themselves of school choice.”).  The stat-
ute provides for various surrogates to stand in place of the parent where the actual
parent is unavailable, see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23) (2006), but nothing in the statute
requires a parent who is simply uninvolved, for whatever reason, to act.  The state
complaint procedure permits anyone (not just parents) to file a complaint alleging a
violation of the statute, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(a)(1) (2010), but there are few incen-
tives for individuals or organizations other than parents to file complaints on behalf
of individual children, so complaints filed by nonparents tend to be systemic. See
generally Monica Costello, Note, Systemic Compliance Complaints: Making IDEA’s Enforce-
ment Provisions a Reality, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 507, 513–18 (2008) (discussing limi-
tations of relying on individual enforcement and the virtues of organizational systemic
complaints).
152 See Neal & Kirp, supra note 51, at 354. R
153 See id.; cf. Julie A. Davies & Lisa M. Bohon, Re-imagining Public Enforcement of
Title IX, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 25, 44 n.99 (describing litigation as an “irreparable
breach of the relationship between parties where no future relationship is expected to
exist”).
154 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 75–106 (1995) (discussing evidence that dif-
ferent geographies have different subcultures).
155 See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 70. R
156 See, e.g., McGroarty, supra note 59, at 291. R
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not at a comparative disadvantage, leading to disproportionate filing
of complaints.157  On the flip side, in smaller, less wealthy districts
where everyone knows everyone else, parents may be reluctant to push
for additional services to which their children may be entitled because
of social pressure not to overburden the district’s finances.  Other par-
ents may not raise claims because of cultural expectations that the
school knows best.  These variations underscore the inefficiency of
relying on parents to raise claims as an enforcement strategy.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the cost of hiring an attor-
ney is a considerable transaction cost that affects families differently
depending on the extent of their financial resources.  To limit the size
of this transaction cost and incentivize attorneys to take these cases,
the IDEA includes a provision permitting prevailing parents to obtain
attorneys’ fees from the other party.158  However, Congress has shown
157 Cf. Jane Gross, Paying for a Disability Diagnosis to Gain Time on College Boards, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A1 (describing a growing number of students seeking a diag-
nosis of a learning disability); Weiss, supra note 70 (similar). R
158 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).  As indicated above, fee-shifting statutes
are traditionally understood to be part of a system to ensure that people of limited
means have access to attorneys and thereby access to justice. See supra note 53. R
Recent work by James Greiner and Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak has substantially chal-
lenged the extent to which the existing literature on the effect of legal representation
in civil disputes supports the widespread belief that litigants tend to benefit with the
use of attorneys. See generally D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Ran-
domized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: Report of a First Study, a Critical Review of the Litera-
ture, and Prospects for the Future, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1708664.  In reporting the results of an initial study of the effect of
an offer of legal representation in administrative hearings to determine eligibility for
unemployment benefits, Greiner and Pattanakak (1) conclude that a service pro-
vider’s offer of legal representation “had no statistically significant effect on the
probability that a claimant would prevail but that the offer did delay the adjudicatory
process,” id. at 8, 23–48, and (2) critique the existing literature on the effect of legal
representation for “methodological problems so severe as to render their conclusions
untrustworthy, which (we hasten to emphasize) is different from wrong,” id. at 8–9,
48–67.  They include in their critique several studies purporting to show the value of
legal representation in special education hearings. Id., at 50 n.161 (citing MELANIE
ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM 7–9 (2002), available at
http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf (noting that school districts were rep-
resented by counsel in 94% of hearings, compared with parents’ representation by
counsel in only 44% of hearings and finding that 50.4% of parents represented by
counsel won due process hearings, compared with only 16.8% of parents without
counsel who won hearings); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-90-22BR, SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION: THE ATTORNEY FEES PROVISION OF PUBLIC LAW 99-372, at 5 (1989)
(finding that parents prevailed forty-three percent of the time, but that fifty-nine per-
cent of the parents who prevailed had attorneys)).  One need not rely on the argu-
ment that IDEA litigants fare better with attorneys (which, as Greiner and Pattanakak
explain, could well be true but has not satisfactorily been demonstrated through the
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ambivalence about how much it wishes to reduce the size of the trans-
action costs associated with hiring an attorney by placing statutory
restrictions on the fee-shifting provision and by leaving in place
Supreme Court decisions limiting its effect.159  These restrictions help
explain why the provision has not significantly ameliorated the diffi-
culties low-income families face in finding an attorney160 and has not
led to an explosion of IDEA practitioners.161
For example, no attorneys’ fees can be recovered even if parents
prevail at the conclusion of a proceeding if the relief they obtain is
not more favorable than a settlement offer they rejected before the
proceeding began, unless they were “substantially justified” in refusing
the offer.162  Practitioners cannot recover a contingency risk multi-
plier to compensate them more heavily in cases they do win, in recog-
nition of the dangers of not receiving payment in the cases they
lose.163  Further, no attorneys’ fees can be awarded for participation
“gold standard” of a well-run randomized control trial, id. at 6, note 4, and 54) in
order to observe that it is more difficult for low-income litigants to find counsel than
for high-income litigants to do so.
159 See Bagenstos, supra note 53, at 3 (noting limitations on fee-shifting statutes for R
ensuring access to justice).
160 A significant rise in attorney representation and requests for due process hear-
ings followed the creation of the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, supra note 158, at 3, suggesting that it did some of what it was intended to R
do.  However, the finding that wealthier parents are far more likely to use the IDEA’s
enforcement mechanisms than lower-income parents has been remarkably consistent
over time. Compare Hehir & Gamm, supra note 51, at 214 (citing studies from the R
early 1980s), and Neal & Kirp, supra note 51, at 354 (same), with supra Part I.B (dis- R
cussing more recent evidence of enforcement disparities).
161 Many states have very few private attorneys who handle special education cases,
and the various public interest organizations that exist to support low-income parents
are able to serve only a small percentage of those who seek their services. See Brief of
Autism Society of America et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6–10,
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007) (No. 05-983) [hereinafter
Brief of Autism Society of America].  The existence and extent of these public interest
organizations also varies widely by state. See id.
162 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i), (E).  This limitation incorporates the
Supreme Court’s decision in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985), interpreting
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This decision is widely understood to
increase the financial risk of pursuing a case after a settlement offer has been made
and to limit the incentives for litigants to pursue claims without a clear favorable
outcome. See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 1, at 1096–97; Julie Davies, Federal Civil R
Rights Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
197, 222–25 (1997).
163 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C); cf. Davies, supra note 162, at 225–31 (discussing R
effect of City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992), which indicated that con-
tingency risk enhancers are rarely to be permitted under fee-shifting statutes).
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in IEP meetings,164 and attorneys’ fees can be reduced if the parent or
parent’s attorney “unreasonably protracted” the proceedings; if the
fees or hours are determined to be excessive; or if the attorney did not
provide certain information in the due process complaint.165  These
limitations sound reasonable—who could object to attempts to curb
unreasonable attorney or client conduct?—but cumulatively they
amount to the potential for litigation over fees that can lead to uncer-
tainty and delay in payment, which can make attorneys less willing to
take fee-shifting cases.166  No doubt in part to hedge against this
uncertainty and delay, IDEA practitioners often require retainers that
place legal counsel out of the reach of many.167  The limitations on
the attorneys’ fees provision thus work to constrict the supply of prac-
titioners and reduce low-income families’ access to lawyers.
Fee limitations, moreover, are not the only factor limiting the
attractiveness of IDEA cases for attorneys.  Parents and attorneys also
face direct financial risks.  In 2004, Congress added a provision mak-
ing parents or their attorneys responsible for the attorneys’ fees of
defendant school districts under a variety of circumstances: if the com-
plaint is determined to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion, or if the complaint was presented for “any improper purpose,”
such as to delay proceedings unnecessarily.168  Again, these limitations
have much to commend them, incentivizing only proper complaints,
but since the statute also encourages vigorous advocacy on the part of
parents, there is the potential for parents to cross the line into unrea-
sonable advocacy and face a bill for the school district’s legal fees.169
The consequences of this risk fall more heavily upon families without
164 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii).
165 Id. § 1415(i)(3)(F).
166 See Selmi, supra note 5, at 1453–54 (noting that uncertainty surrounding fee R
recovery, sometimes involving litigation and always involving additional costs in docu-
mentation, can constrict attorneys’ willingness to take cases under fee-shifting
statutes).
167 See Brief of Amici Curiae Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates Inc. et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 9 n.4, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516
(2007) (No. 05-983) [hereinafter Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates Inc. Brief]
(describing survey results indicating that retainers in IDEA cases range from $3000 to
$10,000, hourly rates in IDEA cases range from $150 to $450, and total matter costs
for cases at end of litigation range from $10,000 to over $100,000).
168 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)–(III).
169 See Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, 58 FLA. L. REV. 7, 29–30 (2006); cf. Perry A. Zirkel, Impossible Parents?,
84 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 335, 335–336 (2002) (describing school responses to challeng-
ing parents).
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financial resources, and may also limit attorneys’ willingness to take
cases.
A further check on attorneys’ fees results from two Supreme
Court cases.  In 2001, the Court held in Buckhannon Board & Care
Home Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources170
that attorneys’ fees may be awarded only when litigation results in a
court-ordered remedy.171  Ending the previously common practice of
awarding attorneys’ fees in cases where the litigation was the catalyst
for a change in the defendant’s conduct (the so-called “catalyst rule”),
the case has had a negative effect on the bringing of civil rights cases,
with a particularly negative effect on the poor.172  Application of the
Buckhannon rule in IDEA cases has meant that attorneys’ fees are
unavailable in those not infrequent instances where districts and par-
ents resolve their disputes after a formal proceeding is initiated but
before a judgment on the merits.173  It also raises the risk that defend-
ants will engage in “strategic capitulation”: delaying a settlement that
would be expensive for them to implement until the last minute, then
settling and avoiding paying attorneys’ fees.174  More recently, the
Supreme Court held in 2006 in Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy175 that the plain language of the IDEA’s attorneys’
fees provision does not allow prevailing parents to recover the cost of
experts, whose analysis and testimony are often crucial to winning a
case.176  These procedural hurdles thus constrict the ability of the fee-
shifting provision to reduce transaction costs. Buckhannon makes the
170 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
171 See id. at 600.  The case addressed only the attorneys’ fees provisions of the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3636 (2006), and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, but its reasoning has widely been understood to apply to
attorneys’ fees provisions in civil rights statutes more broadly. See generally Albiston &
Nielsen, supra note 1 (describing the effects of Buckhannon in various areas of civil R
rights).
172 See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 1, at 1120–30; Louis S. Rulli & Jason A. R
Leckerman, Unfinished Business: The Fading Promise of ADA Enforcement in the Federal
Courts Under Title I and Its Impact on the Poor, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 595, 636–39
(2005).
173 See Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys’
Fees: Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 541–49; Mark
C. Weber, Litigation Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act After Buckhan-
non Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 357, 360, 370–77 (2004).
174 See Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 1, at 1108–11; Weber, supra note 173, at R
400–01.
175 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
176 See id. at 293–94.
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prospect of fee shifting much less certain, while Murphy forbids reim-
bursement of a significant cost.
These transaction costs are problems not only for due process
proceedings and litigation.  Just as parents may benefit from attorney
representation in those actions, scholars suggest that parents who
appear at mediation sessions without an attorney are at a disadvan-
tage, given the power and informational imbalances that remain pre-
sent even in alternative dispute resolution.177  Limitations on the
availability of special education attorneys thus reinforce the enforce-
ment disparities in mediation.178
As for the state complaint procedure, because it is not an adver-
sarial process, the advantages of having an attorney to file a complaint
are not as great as having an attorney to accompany a family through
a due process hearing.179  It is possible, though, that having an attor-
ney shape the state complaint will produce better results for the com-
plainant, so one might want to encourage attorneys to serve low-
income families throughout this process.180  However, after years in
which courts divided as to whether the complaint process (which
exists only by regulation, not by statute) is a “proceeding” under the
177 See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 55, at 53; Andrea F. Blau, Available Dispute Resolution R
Processes Within the Reauthorized Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act
(IDEIA) of 2004: Where Do Mediation Principles Fit In?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 65, 74–75
(2007); Steven S. Goldberg, Special Education Mediation: Responding to a Proposal for
Reform, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 127, 129–32 (2001); Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is
Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes?  First Empirical Findings, 2
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 60–63 (1997); Stephen Marchese, Putting Square Pegs into
Round Holes: Mediation and the Rights of Children with Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53
RUTGERS L. REV. 333, 344–51 (2001); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1076–78 (1984) (describing the imbalance of power between ADR parties and
the influences those disparities have on settlements); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 57–61 (1999 (questioning whether alternative judicial mod-
els are more procedurally just than traditional litigation).
178 See CHAMBERS ET AL., supra note 43, at 14 (showing that only nine percent of R
the lowest-income and five percent of the middle-income districts had any media-
tions, while forty-three percent of the highest-income districts did).
179 To file a complaint, an individual need only present basic information such as
the complained of facts and a proposed resolution. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.153(a)–(b)
(2010).  The state agency then conducts whatever investigation is necessary and
reaches a conclusion. See id. § 300.152(a).  No hearing is available.
180 Cf. Moss et al., supra note 10, at 98–101 (noting that representation by an R
attorney during the process of filing a complaint with the EEOC has an important
effect on the size of benefits, although the overall benefit rate is about the same with
or without an attorney, but questioning whether lawyers cause better outcomes or
whether they sign onto stronger cases).
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IDEA as to which the fee-shifting provision applies,181 the Department
of Education has recently clarified its position that it is not.182  This
regulatory design choice is yet another limitation on the availability of
attorneys for families without financial resources.
While these statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal limitations
weaken the ability of the attorneys’ fees provision to mitigate transac-
tion costs, even in their absence attorneys’ fees provisions cannot
reduce transaction costs in one significant way: there is always the risk
that parents will lose183 and be left with a legal bill that can be larger
than the cost of the services they were fighting to obtain.184  This risk
again acts as a larger deterrent for those who cannot afford to pay for
an attorney than for those who can.
III. WHY REFORM OF THE IDEA’S PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS IS INSUFFICIENT
Information asymmetries, externalities, and transaction costs
could be greatly reduced if low-cost or free legal services were widely
available and if class actions were more broadly used.185  Accordingly,
several scholars have proposed ways to incentivize attorneys to take up
IDEA cases or to mandate the provision of counsel in these cases and
have called for an increase in IDEA class actions.  However, as detailed
below, there are insurmountable political obstacles to implementing a
number of these ideas, and some would be undesirable even were they
181 Compare Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023, 1026–30 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding fees available in complaint procedure), and Upper Valley Ass’n for
Handicapped Citizens v. Blue Mountain Union Sch. Dist. No. 21, 973 F. Supp. 429,
433–36 (D. Vt. 1997) (same), with Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., 343 F.3d 598, 601–02 (2d
Cir. 2003) (no fees available in complaint procedure), and Johnson v. Fridley Pub.
Sch., No. 01-1219, 2002 WL 334403, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2002) (same).
182 See 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,602 (Aug. 14, 2006).
183 The risk of losing is not an idle fear. See James R. Newcomer & Perry A. Zirkel,
An Analysis of Judicial Outcomes of Special Education Cases, 65 J. EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 469,
474 (1999) (finding, in IDEA cases litigated between 1975 and 1995, that school dis-
tricts won the majority of cases at the state administrative level and that, although at
the conclusion of all proceedings, including judicial appeals, parents won with more
frequency, the rate of success was still fairly evenly split between parents and school
districts).
184 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 173, at 520, 522 (noting that cost of IDEA services R
that are subject of disputes are often smaller than attorneys’ fees required to obtain
them).
185 As noted earlier, supra note 158, whether attorneys have a positive effect on a R
litigant’s chances of success is an empirically contested proposition.  This Part does
not take a position on this question but rather explains why, even assuming the value
of attorneys, reforms to increase attorney involvement are unlikely to be sufficient in
this context.
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politically feasible.  This Part thus argues that tinkering with the
design of the IDEA’s private enforcement system is unlikely to remedy
enforcement disparities.  The Part concludes by explaining why
means-testing the benefits provided under the statute or eliminating
private enforcement entirely would be no more satisfactory.
A. Incentivizing Lawyers by Changing Attorneys’ Fees Rules
A number of scholars and commentators have suggested that the
rules governing attorney compensation in IDEA cases should be modi-
fied to replace the Buckhannon rule with the catalyst rule186 and to
eliminate the Murphy rule by including the award of expert costs as
part of attorneys’ fees.187
The latter of these seems within the realm of possibility.  The
Supreme Court decided Murphy in the face of a Conference Commit-
tee Report indicating that expert costs should be available under the
fee-shifting provision of the IDEA.188  Other civil rights statutes explic-
itly provide that expert costs may be included as part of fees,189 and at
least one bill to overturn Murphy has already been introduced.190
Revising the Murphy rule would be helpful to low-income liti-
gants, but the Murphy rule is a minor obstacle in comparison with the
other restrictions on attorneys’ fees, and those restrictions are much
less likely to be modified.  In particular, Congress declined to rein-
state the catalyst rule in the last reauthorization of the IDEA, and bills
to overrule Buckhannon in general have been similarly unsuccessful.191
186 See, e.g., Weber, supra note 173, at 360, 370–77; see also Hanson, supra note 173, R
at 541–49 (describing how Buckhannon makes the matter of attorneys’ fees a negotiat-
ing issue).
187 See, e.g., Ashlie D’Errico Surur, Note, Placing the Ball in Congress’ Court: A Critical
Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Arlington Central School District Board of
Education v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455 (2006), 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
547, 598–602 (2007); Leslie Reed, Comment, Is a Free Appropriate Public Education
Really Free? How the Denial of Expert Witness Fees Will Adversely Impact Children with
Autism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 251, 298–302 (2008).
188 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 308–09
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189 See Davies, supra note 162, at 263–64 (noting that expert fees are available R
under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act).
190 See IDEA Fairness Restoration Act, H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. (2007).  Although
the bill did not make it out of committee, the issue is likely to be considered as part of
the upcoming IDEA reauthorization. See NANCY LEE JONES & CAROL J. TOLAND, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R 40521, THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA)
1–2, 24 (2009).
191 See, e.g., Settlement Encouragement and Fairness Act, S. 1117, 108th Cong.
(2003).
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Moreover, even if Buckhannon were to be replaced with the catalyst
rule, the other restrictions on attorneys’ fees would still disproportion-
ately burden low-income litigants,192 and it is just not plausible that
the entire scheme governing attorneys’ fees would be substantially
modified.  The last two reauthorizations have focused on ways to make
interactions between schools and parents less adversarial, as exempli-
fied by the ever-growing restrictions on attorneys’ fees and the push
towards alternative dispute resolution.  Congress has been looking for
ways to take lawyers out of the process, not to increase their ranks.
Given this trend, the transformation of the attorneys’ fees provision is
not likely.
But even if the political stars aligned to make such a modification
possible, two central problems would remain.  The first, of course, is
that parents who do not prevail are not entitled to attorneys’ fees, and
parents who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer in the event that they
lose are likely to be deterred from bringing cases.  The second is that
fee-shifting provisions do nothing to counter the other difficulties
associated with bringing claims.193  Even the purest fee-shifting provi-
sion cannot make up for limitations associated with lack of knowledge,
uninvolved parents, risks in challenging the school system, and social
and cultural factors.  While the limitations in the attorneys’ fees provi-
sion place disproportionate burdens on low-income families, the
removal of these limitations would not actually level the playing field.
Even if it were politically feasible, then, changing the rules about
when attorneys’ fees may be awarded is not likely to significantly ame-
liorate the IDEA enforcement disparities.
B. Incentivizing Lawyers by Providing Damages
Research suggests that the availability of damages can have an
even bigger effect on incentivizing attorneys to take civil rights cases
than fee-shifting provisions do.  For example, one study found that
civil rights lawyers were reluctant to take cases with low damages—
which tended to be cases of low-income individuals—even where stat-
utory attorneys’ fees were available.194  This was so because in practice,
higher damages meant greater compensation for attorneys in light of
the prevalence of contingency-fee arrangements.195  As a result, low-
income potential plaintiffs have a more difficult time finding counsel
192 See supra Part II.D.
193 See supra Part II.D.
194 See Davies, supra note 162, at 232–37. R
195 See id. at 219.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-4\NDL402.txt unknown Seq: 41 23-SEP-11 12:28
2011] the  limits  of  private  enforcement 1453
than the existence of fee-shifting statutes would predict.196  Another
study reviewed the increase in filings of employment and housing dis-
crimination cases after the relevant statutes increased the availability
of damages and concluded that “the availability of damages, rather
than fees, was the strongest incentive for private attorneys” to take on
cases.197
The difficulty low-income families face in finding lawyers to take
their IDEA cases may thus be partially explained by the absence of a
damages provision in the statute.  The relief generally requested is a
revised IEP, although occasionally parents seek either compensatory
education or reimbursement for expenses associated with obtaining
private education in the absence of the school district’s provision of
FAPE.198  None of these remedies provides any financial incentive for
an attorney.  The courts are split on whether § 1983 may be used to
enforce the IDEA and thereby obtain damages, but the weight of
authority suggests that this avenue is not available.199  In any event,
even in courts that have permitted damages in special education cases,
damages are limited to instances of bad faith or gross misconduct,
situations that do not describe the typical IDEA dispute, which con-
cerns the types or amounts of special services provided.200
196 See id. at 258–59 (“[I]t is abundantly apparent that despite the existence of the
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act and other fee-shifting statutes, persons of low socioeco-
nomic status appear less able to attain representation in a federal civil rights case. . . .
Exceptions exist, of course, but there is good reason to believe that the promise of the
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act—enforcement of federal civil rights even though the
rights may be non-pecuniary in nature—is sometimes illusory.”).
197 See Selmi, supra note 5, at 1453–54; see also James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing R
Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049,
1076–78, 1091 (1989) (describing dampening effect on private enforcement of pre-
1988 limitations on damages in the Fair Housing Act); Robert G. Schwemm, Private
Enforcement and the Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375, 379–81 (1988)
(same).
198 See Hanson, supra note 173, at 544–45; Weber, supra note 173, at 402–03. R
199 The First, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that § 1983
may not be used to enforce the IDEA. See Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d
934, 937 (9th Cir. 2007); A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 806 (3d Cir.
2007) (en banc); Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2006); Padilla
v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000); Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d
524, 532 (4th Cir. 1998).  The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have permitted
such suits in certain circumstances, but these cases all predate the Supreme Court’s
tightening of the doctrine governing § 1983 in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,
290 (2002). See Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 1997); Digre v. Rose-
ville Schs. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1988); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi,
832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987).
200 These damages cases also tend to be brought under the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which are not identical in scope
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The addition of a damages remedy might well open up a legal
market to serve low-income families if the damages were large
enough.  But this, too, is likely politically infeasible for the same rea-
sons that modifying the entire attorneys’ fees structure is not.
Moreover, adding a damages remedy to the typical IDEA case
would be normatively undesirable.  Cases involving harassment, abuse,
or willful neglect might justify an award of damages for deterrence
and compensation purposes, but equitable remedies are a more
appropriate response in cases simply involving disagreements about
the set of services that constitute a child’s FAPE.201  In addition, as a
practical matter, damages requests would be accompanied by allega-
tions of educator bad faith and misconduct instead of mere profes-
sional disagreement, which would make IDEA disputes even more
contentious and difficult than they already are.202  And, of course,
adding a damages remedy might attract more counsel, but it would
not incentivize parents who are unaware of their rights to bring claims
in the first place.  Ironically, a damages remedy might thus end up
benefitting wealthier families more than poor families.
C. Providing or Mandating Attorneys
Instead of looking for ways to incentivize lawyers to take on IDEA
cases through the market, some commentators have recently begun to
call for providing a mandatory legal advocate for parents in IEP meet-
ings and beyond.203  While the contours of this proposal take a num-
ber of possible shapes, the goal is generally to avoid the difficulties of
limited attorney incentives, the cost of funding a case, and parents’
lack of knowledge of their rights by providing an attorney or other
non-attorney legal advocate as a matter of right.
Increasing public funding for private enforcement efforts,
whether through Legal Services Centers, the Parent Information Cen-
ters that the IDEA already requires, or some other entity, would cer-
tainly be a good idea.204  Private law firms, law school clinics, and
nonprofit organizations should also continue to sponsor IDEA advo-
to the IDEA. See Marc C. Weber, Damages Liability in Special Education Cases, 21 REV.
LITIG. 83, 86 (2002); Weber, supra note 173, at 404–05. R
201 See Weber, supra note 200, at 86; Weber, supra note 173, at 404–05. R
202 See Weber, supra note 173, at 404–05. R
203 See Costello, supra note 151, at 523; Phillips, supra note 17, at 1842–52; Wake- R
lin, supra note 17, at 284. R
204 Hehir, supra note 17, at 837; cf. LANDSBERG, supra note 9, at 43 (discussing R
negative effect of limited resources on enforcement efforts of civil rights
organizations).
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cacy efforts.  But it is unlikely that it would be feasible to mandate
legal services on the scale needed to level the playing field.
This is so first because of the cost involved.  To provide an indi-
vidualized advocate for each of the six million children covered by the
IDEA would be prohibitively expensive.  Assuming a cost of $3000 per
child—on the low end of attorney retainers to represent families in
IDEA cases—the total would be eighteen billion dollars per year, or
fifty percent more than the twelve billion dollars that is the current
total annual federal contribution to the IDEA.205  One way to cabin
the cost would be to run pilot programs in individual states or dis-
tricts,206 but this would only exacerbate geographical disparities in
enforcement.  Another way to cabin the cost would be to provide legal
assistance only to those who qualify under a means test.  But even this
limited proposal would likely be financially infeasible.  For example,
to provide advocates to the approximately twenty percent of students
served under the IDEA who live in poverty would cost $3.6 billion.207
Moreover, even if the cost of a means-tested public attorney pro-
gram were not prohibitive, limiting legal assistance to the poor would
likely be a political nonstarter, since IDEA cases remain expensive
even for middle-class families.208  Other political difficulties exist.
Given the antilawyer trend of the last few reauthorizations, it is
unlikely that a proposal to inject private advocates wholesale would
succeed.209  In addition, given concerns that special education budg-
ets are draining general education budgets,210 there is likely to be
political resistance to the idea of providing a personal advocate to
children with disabilities, on top of the other individualized extras
that some feel these children are already receiving.  This proposal is
not likely to gain any traction.
205 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. G, tit. III,
121 Stat. 1844, 2190–220 (2007); Council of Parent Attorneys & Advocates Inc. Brief,
supra note 167, at 10 n.4 (retainers in IDEA cases range from $3000 to $10,000). R
206 Cf. Phillips, supra note 17, at 1847–53 (outlining different proposals for R
improving external advocacy in special education, such as parent advocacy centers).
207 See Blackorby & Wagner, supra note 88, at 2–5. R
208 See supra note 167 (describing cost of typical special education proceeding). R
209 See supra Part III.A.
210 See, e.g., Gregory F. Corbett, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education
Finance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Violate a General Education Stu-
dent’s Fundamental Right to Education?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 633, 634–36 (1999) (discussing
the effect of special education on general education funding); Heubert, supra note
141, at 312 (same). R
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D. Bringing Class Actions
If remedies for individual private actions are too individualized to
result in positive externalities for other children, might a greater use
of class actions be a way to use private enforcement of the law to
improve enforcement for children in poverty?  Thomas Hehir has pro-
posed this as one strategy.211  Class actions do have the potential to
improve services for low-income children (and others), especially to
ensure systemic compliance with procedural aspects of the IDEA.212
But—as Hehir acknowledges—class actions on their own will not satis-
factorily address the problems associated with wealth-based enforce-
ment disparities.213
Imagine a class action dealing with the central concern of this
Article: an allegation that the quality of services being offered to poor
children is inadequate (whether in the abstract or in comparison to
the services offered to wealthier children).214  It would be difficult to
meet the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in such a case.  Common questions of law and fact would likely
not predominate, because defendants could reasonably attempt to jus-
tify why the services offered to each individual child were appropriate
for that child.215  The same problem would likely plague attempts to
establish that the defendants had acted or refused to act on grounds
that applied generally to the class216 or that the substantive inade-
quacy of services for any one child were typical of the claims of other
class members.217  Reviewing the substance of IEPs would also likely
lead a court to the conclusion that the case was unmanageable as a
class action, not only because of the scope of such a review but also
because of institutional competence concerns.218  In practice, then,
211 See Hehir, supra note 17, at 837–39. R
212 Id. at 837.
213 Id. at 839.
214 As Hehir points out, it is easier to focus on procedural remedies than substan-
tive educational practices through class actions. Id. at 836–37.  But unless class
actions address the substantive education received by poor children, instead of simply
the procedures by which educational decisions are made, due process proceedings
will continue to enable wealthier children to ensure that their individual needs are
met while class actions will simply ensure bare compliance with rules of general
applicability.
215 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, No.
10-277, slip op. at 8–12, 18–19 (U.S. June 20, 2011) (discussing commonality
requirement).
216 See id. R. 23(b)(2).
217 See id. R. 23(a)(3).
218 See id. R. 23(b)(3)(D).  Institutional competence concerns in judicial review of
individual due process proceedings are quite different, because judges reviewing
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while class actions are an important complement to due process hear-
ings for their (at least theoretical, and at times actual219) ability to
ensure that a district complies with the procedural requirements of
the law, they cannot adequately protect the substantive rights of lower-
income children.220
In addition, it would be difficult to scale-up class actions around
the country to the extent necessary to ensure adequate enforcement
of the law everywhere.221  Where special education legal practitioners
are scarce, which is most places in the country,222 it is difficult to envi-
sion where they would find the resources to engage in the time- and
labor-intensive work of a class action and how they could still find the
time to represent individual low-income children in due process hear-
ings.  While class actions might accomplish useful things in particular
districts, it is not an efficient strategy to rely on them to enforce the
law throughout the country.
There is a further problem with the idea of using class actions to
better enforce the law for low-income children.  A class action that
would seek to establish that wealthier children received better services
than similarly situated poor children would have to convince wealthier
children and their parents that it was in their interest to redress this
inequity in order to obtain information on the substantive services
offered in their IEPs.  Because wealthier children might justifiably be
concerned that such a lawsuit would culminate in a decline in their
services, they might be reluctant to provide this information willingly.
Procedural problems would then likely compound this problem.
While information on wealthier children’s IEPs could potentially be
obtained through a subpoena, districts would likely object on privacy
those cases may not substitute their own views for those of school authorities and
experts but instead must give the state administrative decisions under review “due
weight.”  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205–08 (1982); see also Terry Jean
Seligman, Rowley Comes Home to Roost: Judicial Review of Autism Special Education Dis-
putes, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 217, 232–37 (2005) (discussing the “deferential
standard of review” set forth in Rowley).  In contrast, judges reviewing the substance of
IEPs in a class action would have no administrative record to review but would be
making decisions on educational substance in the first instance.
219 See Hehir, supra note 17, at 836–37 (noting that a number of districts have R
been under IDEA consent decrees stemming from class actions for years without dem-
onstrating real reform).
220 See Weber, supra note 173, at 360, 407–08 (discussing difficulty of meeting R
Rule 23 requirements in IDEA cases).
221 Hehir, supra note 17, at 839; cf. Schwemm, supra note 190, at 383 (observing R
that geographic distribution of cases brought under the Fair Housing Act is uneven
and connected to the uneven distribution of fair housing advocacy organizations).
222 See Brief of Autism Society of America, supra note 161, at 6–8. R
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grounds.223  Even if plaintiffs were ultimately to prevail against such
objections, these disputes would add to the efficiency concerns with
using class actions as a large-scale enforcement mechanism.  In any
event, low-income plaintiffs would still need enough information to
make a plausible case to a judge that they should survive a motion to
dismiss, which—if they have not obtained information willingly from
wealthier students—would be difficult to do.224
Finally, the Supreme Court continues to underscore its distaste
for institutional reform litigation, into which category IDEA class
actions surely fall.225  This aversion arises in part because of the “sensi-
tive federalism concerns”226 raised by the prospect of federal courts
ordering states and localities what to do, especially in “areas of core
state responsibility, such as public education,”227 and especially where
“a federal-court decree has the effect of dictating state or local budget
priorities.”228  While “federal courts must vigilantly enforce federal law
and must not hesitate in awarding necessary relief,”229 the Court
recently explained, courts must nonetheless take a hard look at
injunctions emanating from institutional reform cases and be willing
to dissolve them and return control to the state as soon as the circum-
stances that led to the order have changed.230  Injunctions stemming
from IDEA class actions might thus be dissolved before plaintiffs feel
adequate progress has been made.  In the absence of some other
enforcement mechanism to fill in thereafter, the effect of class actions
could be time-limited.
223 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(C), (c)(2)(B).  Although courts have refused to
enforce subpoenas seeking information about other children’s IEPs as irrelevant in
individual litigation, see supra note 123 and accompanying text, I am unaware of any R
such rulings in class action litigation.
224 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50
(2009) (explaining that, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, a complaint
must plead “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and
that Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions”).
225 See Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2593–95 (2009) (placing action challeng-
ing state school funding practice under the federal Equal Education Opportunity Act
of 1974 in the category of institutional reform litigation); id. at 2615–21 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (critiquing majority’s crafting special rules for review of orders in institu-
tional reform cases).
226 Id. at 2593 (majority opinion).
227 Id.
228 Id. at 2593–94.
229 Id. at 2594.
230 See id. at 2594–95.
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E. Means-Testing or Eliminating Private Enforcement
A final reform might be to explode the current system altogether,
whether by means-testing the services offered under the IDEA or by
eliminating private enforcement entirely.  While these proposals may
seem at some level to fit one-to-one with the identified problem,
implementing them is not an appropriate solution.
First, means-testing the program would disregard the important
human values expressed in ensuring access to public education for all
children with disabilities.  Wealthier children no less than poor chil-
dren deserve not to be turned away by their neighborhood schools.
Making special education available to everyone further reflects the
fact that disability is a possibility for everyone.
Second, means-testing the program would in the end run counter
to the goal of improving the adequacy and equity of special education
services provided to low-income children by destroying what works in
the political economy of the IDEA, which has long been supported by
an unusual coalition across social classes231 and across political par-
ties.232  As Gillian Lester, a prominent critic of inequities in special
education,233 explains, “advocacy (largely by middle-class parents) on
behalf of their own children succeeded in shifting the baseline—rela-
tive to the status quo ante—of publicly provided services for all chil-
dren with disabilities,” thereby “benefit[ting] both wealthy and poor
children with special needs—albeit perhaps not in equal mea-
sure[.]”234  Poor children with disabilities have undoubtedly gained
from the self-interested advocacy of families with more financial
resources on the whole—whether in litigation broadly defining rights
under the IDEA, amendments to the statute setting expansive terms,
or generous appropriations decisions—even if in the particulars of
individual cases the positive externalities are minor.
More generally, a large literature in social welfare law and policy
suggests that, somewhat paradoxically, universal programs may
achieve more redistribution than means-tested programs do because
231 See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? Law, Social
Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, 64 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manu-
script at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1461098.
232 See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 43, at 150 (explaining that because disabilities R
“fall upon rich and poor, black and white, and residents of inner cities, suburbs, and
farm districts—even members of Congress and their families,” “normal political cleav-
ages—between Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, North and
South, rural and urban—[are] nearly irrelevant”).
233 See generally KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17. R
234 Lester, supra note 231, at 5. R
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they may be more politically durable.235  There is thus value in striving
to keep the socio-economic breadth of the program while nonetheless
looking for ways to reduce inequality.  Instead of alienating wealthier
families, the better approach is to find a way to harness their involve-
ment in a way that benefits low-income families.  In this respect, the
IDEA presents an opening for the type of “tying” strategy advocated by
James Ryan: to “link[ ] the fates of poor children with those from
more affluent families . . . as a political strategy for equalizing educa-
tional opportunities.”236
Further, as a practical matter, it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to means test the services provided under the IDEA because of
the close connection between the IDEA and the antidiscrimination
provision of Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.237  Section
504 prevents discrimination on the basis of disability by any “program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”238  The regulations
implementing Section 504 in the public school context require
schools to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all chil-
dren who qualify for protection under the statute and explain that
implementation of an IEP under the IDEA is one way of satisfying that
requirement.239  For children who do not qualify for services under
the IDEA but do qualify as disabled under Section 504,240 a “504
accommodation plan” is available.241  Much of what is currently made
available in an IEP could also be made available under a 504 accom-
modation plan242—just without the additional funds the IDEA pro-
vides.  Because of this reality, and because antidiscrimination laws are
235 See, e.g., id. at 5, 15–22; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114
YALE L.J. 1, 70–73 (2004).
236 See RYAN, supra note 92, at 271–72. R
237 Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 794 (2006)).
238 29 U.S.C. § 794.
239 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a), (b)(2) (2010).
240 As explained above, to qualify for services under the IDEA, a child must (1) be
classified as having a statutorily recognized disability and (2) need special education
and related services because of that disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(1); supra note
24.  To qualify as disabled under Section 504, a child must “(i) ha[ve] a physical or R
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii)
ha[ve] a record of such an impairment, or (iii) [be] regarded as having such an
impairment.”  34 C.F.R. § 104.33(j)(1).  For a study of students who qualify under
Section 504 but not under the IDEA, see Holler & Zirkel, supra note 59. R
241 See Perry A. Zirkel, Comparison of IDEA IEP’s and Sec. 504 Accommodation Plans,
191 EDUC. L. REP. 563 (2004) [hereinafter Zirkel, Comparison]; Perry A. Zirkel, The
Substantive Standard for FAPE: Does Section 504 Require Less than the IDEA?, 106 EDUC. L.
REP. 471 (1996) [hereinafter Zirkel, The Substantive Standard].
242 See Zirkel, Comparison, supra note 241; Zirkel, The Substantive Standard, supra R
note 241. R
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not subject to means-testing in the way that service-provision is, there
would be little point in means-testing the IDEA, even setting aside the
political benefits of involvement across the socio-economic spectrum.
The goal of preserving the political economy of the statute fur-
ther helps explain my disinclination to eliminate private enforcement
of the IDEA.  Such enforcement is a core commitment of the statute
in general and is of particular importance to the (wealthier) demo-
graphic that tends to take advantage of it.  Few suggestions, I think,
would more swiftly eviscerate the possibility of real reform that would
benefit poor children with disabilities than to argue that private
enforcement should be cut.
Moreover, eliminating private enforcement of the IDEA would
likely reduce the benefits offered to wealthier children under the stat-
ute, thereby promoting equality by leveling down.  As I have indicated,
however, the issue is not only one of equity but also one of ade-
quacy.243  It is therefore worth exploring alternative reforms to the
enforcement system that would permit wealthier children to retain
their full rights under the statute while nonetheless improving the lot
of poor children.  The next Part begins such an exploration.
IV. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES
A. Rationales for Public Enforcement
In the absence of a viable large-scale private enforcement strategy
for low-income children, two questions emerge.  First, is public
enforcement appropriate at all, given the norm of private lawsuits that
pervades the American legal system?244  Second, if public enforce-
ment is appropriate, can it really avoid the problems for children in
poverty associated with private enforcement?
As to the first question, my argument should not be taken to sug-
gest that private litigation should give way to public enforcement
wherever it is difficult for people in poverty to enforce their rights.245
Instead, the normative justification for public enforcement of the
IDEA is rooted in the close connection between enforcement and
administration of a statute.
243 See supra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. R
244 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3 (2003).
245 For a variety of perspectives on the difficulties people in poverty have in pro-
tecting their rights across all domains of law, as well as proposals for reform, see gen-
erally ABA Symposium on Access to Justice, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2010).
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Where a statute is enacted to effectuate a particular public policy
and private enforcement is insufficient to effectuate that policy, it is
reasonable to suggest that public enforcement is necessary if the stat-
ute is to be properly administered.  For example, if private enforce-
ment actions are disproportionately brought by one segment of a
statute’s intended beneficiaries with particular demographic charac-
teristics, there is likely to be underdeterrence of the wrong the statute
seeks to redress with respect to other demographics.246  Even if private
action is enforcing the right at a generally adequate level, that action
may focus on an aspect of that right that is more narrowly in the pri-
vate interest instead of the public interest.247  The need for public
enforcement may be particularly acute where distribution of govern-
ment funding or resources is at issue, for where there is underdeter-
rence, there may also be undercompensation of the individuals the
public policy seeks to protect.248  Alternatively, compensation may be
skewed towards one set of individuals when public policy would prefer
that compensation either be skewed towards a different set of individ-
uals or spread across the class more evenly.249  In turn, underdeter-
rence and undercompensation may breed cynicism that leads to
negative repercussions in other areas of compliance with the stat-
ute.250  Because—as earlier sections of this Article explain—all of
these problems find analogues in private enforcement of the IDEA,
attention to public enforcement strategies is appropriate.
As to the question of whether public enforcement of the IDEA
can really serve poor children better than private enforcement does, I
do not mean to paint a naively optimistic picture of the potential for
246 Cf. LANDSBERG, supra note 9, at 46 (stating that private rights of action in civil R
rights laws serve deterrence and compensation functions as well as vindicate public
policies against discrimination); Stephenson, supra note 5, at 95, 98 (noting that R
many statutory rights of action, including those that are linked to private plaintiffs’
individual interests, serve a public deterrence function).
247 See LANDSBERG, supra note 9, at 46, 118 (noting that adequate protection of R
public values may not be satisfied where enforcement rests entirely with private par-
ties because private parties pursue narrow individual agendas where public agencies
pursue the public interest).
248 See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2002) (discuss-
ing compensatory rationale in certain statutory schemes); Stephenson, supra note 5, R
at 95, 98, 103–04 (discussing link between compensation and deterrence in private
enforcement of statutory rights of action).
249 See Stephenson, supra note 5, at 118 (discussing potential for private enforce-
ment to skew enforcement away from agency priorities).
250 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 97, 172–73 (2006) (discussing
the importance of procedural fairness in people’s assessments of justice).
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public enforcement, given the dangers of inefficiency,251 inadequate
resources,252 and capture253 mentioned above.  Beyond these general
problems, in the particular context of the IDEA, there have long been
concerns that the federal government and the states have failed to
enforce the IDEA adequately.  These concerns stem from observations
that even though the federal agency charged with IDEA enforcement
repeatedly found states in violation of the IDEA, it has almost never
taken any formal action to withdraw funds, limiting its involvement to
negotiation and acceptance of minimal improvements.254
I do, however, want to suggest that these problems pose design
challenges rather than insurmountable limitations.  To limit ineffi-
ciencies, public enforcement should take advantage of what is effi-
cient about private enforcement while avoiding duplication of effort
and unnecessary oversight.  To limit the problem of resource con-
straints, public enforcement should target its efforts to where the
need is greatest and should engage in interventions that can have a
transformational effect on a system as a whole.  To limit capture, pub-
lic enforcement should capitalize on the potential for varying con-
cerns among low-income parents of children with disabilities,
wealthier parents of children with disabilities, parents of children
without disabilities, and local school systems.255  And to limit replica-
251 See, e.g., Cohen & Rubin, supra note 2, at 169–72. R
252 Id. at 188; cf. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Over-
sight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171 (1984)
(arguing that congressional oversight operating under a “fire alarm” model of
responding to problems is more effective than a “police patrol” model of looking for
problems to which to respond).
253 See Stephenson, supra note 5, at 130. R
254 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS 7, 53
(2000); Thomas Hehir, IDEA and Disproportionality: Federal Enforcement, Effective Advo-
cacy, and Strategies for Change, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 17, R
at 219, 222; Arun K. Ramanathan, Paved with Good Intentions: The Federal Role in the
Oversight and Enforcement of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), 110 TEACHERS COLL. REC. 278, 290 (2008).
255 Cf. Stephenson, supra note 5, at 131 (discussing research finding that the cap- R
ture problem “has been wildly overstated,” because agencies respond to “public inter-
est” concerns as well as competing interest groups, and observing that agencies with
“broad jurisdiction [that] respond to (and draw their personnel from) multiple con-
stituencies with competing interests” are less subject to the risk of capture).  The fact
that the federal government has rarely taken steps to withdraw funds from states that
have failed to fully comply with the IDEA is not necessarily a sign of capture by the
state and local educational establishment at the expense of the disability lobby.  It
may instead be a sign of reluctance to withdraw money from needy and blameless
children, especially where the problems of compliance are nuanced and complicated.
Cf. Jeremy Rabkin, Office for Civil Rights, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 304, 340–42
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tion of historical concerns about inadequate public enforcement of
the IDEA, a reenvisioned public enforcement should present options
beyond a simple funding cut-off and should include provisions that
mandate certain types of action when certain conditions are met.  No
system—public or private—will be perfect,256 but there are better and
worse ways to structure each, and regime architects should learn from
past successes and failures.
In any event, given the significant amount of extant public over-
sight of the IDEA,257 the relevant policy issue does not involve the
first-order question about whether to build a public enforcement sys-
tem from scratch.  The issue instead is how best to build on the cur-
rent public regulatory scheme to ensure adequate and equitable
enforcement of the law for poor children in light of the deficits of
private enforcement.  An improved public enforcement system should
thus avoid the need for individuals to raise claims on their own behalf;
have a broad geographic reach; create positive externalities beyond
the scope of any particular intervention; and incentivize the relevant
parties to provide appropriate special education services for low-
income children.  It should also be sensitive to the concerns about
inefficiency, resource constraints, capture, and IDEA enforcement his-
tory just mentioned.
The next subpart offers three proposals to improve public
enforcement along these lines: one based on informational regula-
tion, one based on monitoring and investigation, and one based on
financial incentives.  In each case, I propose a weak version and a
strong version and assess their pros, cons, and likely feasibility.  Pre-
liminarily, it bears noting that none of these proposals involves a pub-
lic litigation strategy, although the traditional model for public
enforcement is often a lawsuit.258  Instead, the proposals tend towards
the bureaucratic and administrative.  This is a deliberate choice
reflecting the IDEA’s status as a cooperative federalism program with
significant existing infrastructure at the federal, state, and local levels.
This infrastructure means that there is a relatively quick and efficient
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (outlining a similar challenge with respect to threats to
cut off federal funds allocated to school districts that faced difficulties desegregating).
256 In fact, one might frame the problems of inefficiency, inadequate resources,
and capture as problems for the private enforcement system as well, given the poten-
tial for too many lawsuits to be brought in one context and not enough in another;
the difficulty that many low-income families have in finding and paying for lawyers;
and the fact that in some contexts, wealthier families may receive more than their fair
share of IDEA funds.
257 See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text. R
258 See, e.g., LANDSBERG, supra note 9, at 5. R
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way of effecting change in each of the 16,000 school districts in the
country every year and on an ongoing basis.259  Public litigation does
not therefore appear to be the most promising strategy.
B. Proposals for Public Enforcement
1. Informational Regulation
a. Design Details
The collection and publicity of data or information is an increas-
ingly important regulatory strategy.260  Where no private party has an
incentive to ensure that the public is provided with important infor-
mation, mandatory disclosure can be an appropriate governmental
response.261  Mandating disclosure can be both less expensive and
more efficient than command-and-control mechanisms, by giving peo-
ple the information they need to make decisions rather than by
requiring particular means or ends.262  In addition, mandatory disclo-
sure can encourage political processes to work by equipping citizens
with information to hold their government accountable.263
The IDEA already requires a good deal of data collection and
disclosure.  For example, states must provide both to the Secretary of
Education and to the public on an annual basis certain kinds of infor-
mation disaggregated by race, ethnicity, limited English proficiency
status, gender, and disability category (but notably not by income or
socioeconomic class).264  This information includes the number and
percentage of children who are receiving a free, appropriate public
education; participating in regular education; placed in separate clas-
ses or facilities; and subject to alternative placements because of disci-
259 For a breakdown of the number of school districts in each state, see Rural
Education in America, NAT’L CENTER EDUC. STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/
ruraled/TablesHTML/5localedistricts.asp (last visited June 13, 2011).
260 See Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618 (1999).  For the importance of data collecting
to enforcement efforts, and for the role of the government in particular in these
efforts, see generally Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 244–47 (2001); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A
Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and
Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183, 240–43 (2003); Louis S. Rulli,
Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the Perspective of the Poor: Can the
Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 359–77 (2000); and Selmi, supra note 5, at 1456–58. R
261 See Sunstein, supra note 260, at 624. R
262 See id. at 625.
263 See id. at 625–26.
264 20 U.S.C. § 1418(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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plinary issues.265  Where the data reveal disproportional
identification, placement, and disciplinary treatment by race or
ethnicity, states must take certain steps to review and revise their poli-
cies (but notably not to make particular changes to individual stu-
dents’ IEPs).266
This data collection is important, but more could be done to
focus on children in poverty.  The simplest change would be for pov-
erty data to be added to the list of demographic features for which
information is disaggregated.  This could be done with reference to
“economically disadvantaged” children under Title I,267 the federal
government’s funding stream for compensatory education for chil-
dren in poverty, and/or with eligibility for free or reduced-price
lunch, another federal program for this group.268  The data reports
on the use of due process and mediation should also be disaggregated
to make clear who is taking advantage of these private enforcement
mechanisms.  Calling attention to disparities in the use of special edu-
cation services by socioeconomic status is an important step in work-
ing to remedy them, just as interventions have been designed to
address disparities in the other demographic characteristics.
A more ambitious project would be to move beyond this limited
data collection to a user-friendly database capturing information on
the actual substance of IEPs and demographic characteristics, includ-
ing, to the extent it is available, the income of the student (or a proxy,
or at the very least whether the child is in poverty).  It is often said that
special education is not a place (that is, education in separate rooms
or facilities) but a series of services.269  Yet the statute itself requires
the collection of data on placements, not services.  The move to col-
lect data on services is thus in keeping with the spirit of the statute.  It
is also in keeping with the move to open government and trans-
265 Id. § 1418(a)(1).  Additional data on the number of due process complaints
filed, due process hearings held, mediations held, and settlement agreements
reached through mediation are also required, but there is no requirement that these
data be disaggregated according to demographic characteristics. Id.
§ 1418(a)(1)(F)–(H).
266 See id. § 1418(d).
267 See id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II)(aa). See generally TITLE I (Geoffrey D. Borman et
al. eds., 2001) (providing systemic information regarding Title I education policies
for the improvement and increased efficiency of Title I).
268 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b) (2006).
269 See, e.g., Anna B. Duff, How Special Education Policy Affects Districts, in RETHINK-
ING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY, supra note 59, at 135, 143; cf. 20 U.S.C. R
§ 1400(c)(5)(C) (finding that special education can be more effective as a service to
children with disabilities rather than a place they are sent).
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parency of data in the current administration.270  And it is in keeping
with current educational trends, in which educators are increasingly
finding that data can be used to transform substantive educational
practices for both individual students and schools as a whole.271
What kinds of data should be included?  Possibilities include the
information that led to the construction of the IEPs, such as diagno-
ses, test scores, and evaluations of need, to allow evaluation of the
connection between need and service provision.  Other possibilities
include broader demographic details about the children and their
families, to allow evaluation of the extent to which potentially irrele-
vant factors (such as the extent of parents’ education) enter (even if
implicitly) into decisions about service provision.  Still other possibili-
ties include information about the school and districts, to allow rele-
vant comparisons.272  The data could also match outcomes to these
inputs so that researchers, school staff, parents, and others can associ-
ate IEP services with results.273  Of course such data collection and
publication should be sensitive to privacy concerns and protect stu-
270 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, On First Day, Obama Quickly Sets New Tone, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A1 (describing presidential statements praising transparency
and open government); About, DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov/about (last visited
June 13, 2011) (“The purpose of Data.gov is to increase public access to high value,
machine readable datasets generated by the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government.”).
271 See, e.g., Catherine Gewertz, 9th Grade, By the Numbers, EDUC. WK., Mar. 11,
2009, at 26; Sarah D. Sparks, Data Mining Gets Traction in Education, EDUC. WK., Jan.
12, 2011; Sarah D. Sparks, States Making Great Progress on Student-Data Systems, Report
Finds, EDUC. WK., Feb. 16, 2011.
272 Because FAPE is a floor, not a ceiling, and since districts are not permitted to
take resources into account in ensuring that at least FAPE is provided, it is perhaps
more instructive to see comparisons within districts and between districts with similar
characteristics. See Heubert, supra note 141, at 305 n.14, 321.  That is, it is not that R
interesting to know that Greenwich, Connecticut (with a poverty rate of 4.0%, see
Greenwich, Connecticut, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/Greenwich-
Connecticut.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2011)) provides better services than
Bridgeport, Connecticut (with a poverty rate of 21.1%, see Bridgeport, Connecticut, CITY-
DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/Bridgeport-Connecticut.html (last visited
June 13, 2011)), but it would be interesting to know whether New Haven, Connecticut
(with a poverty rate of 26.7%, see New Haven, Connecticut, CITY-DATA.COM, http://
www.city-data.com/city/New-Haven-Connecticut.html (last visited June 13, 2011))
provides better services than similarly situated Bridgeport, and whether Greenwich
provides better services in schools where there are fewer poor children, because these
latter two disparities would raise red flags.
273 Federal education law increasingly requires schools to implement research-
based strategies and calls for a focus on outcomes. Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(2) (requir-
ing primary focus of federal and state monitoring efforts under the IDEA to be on
“improving educational results and functional outcomes for all children with disabili-
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dents from being personally identified, in keeping with the current
legal framework on data collection under the IDEA.274
Such a database would have at least four goals.  First, it would
help families without financial resources to get a better sense of the
types of services they could be receiving.  Part of the problem with the
private enforcement system is that less wealthy families generally have
less knowledge about possible services than do wealthier families and
school staff.275  Research shows that poor families can make better
educational decisions when they are given more information that is
easy to understand and process.276  This proposal would help in this
regard.
Second, the database would help schools to avoid unintentional
class-based differences as they work with families to draft IEPs.  The
data, in effect, would act as a “nudge” to make better decisions.277
The data would not be a classic nudge, as identified by Richard Thaler
and Cass Sunstein in their articulation of the principle of libertarian
paternalism, because school authorities cannot opt out of the legal
requirements to provide a FAPE under the IDEA, but it would none-
theless respond to many of the insights of behavioral law and econom-
ics that motivate Thaler and Sunstein’s work.278  For example, where
school authorities have “anchored” on a particular set of services for a
particular type of child, it would be useful to see how other schools
and districts respond, because that anchor might not be the best.279
School authorities might also have fallen prey to the “availability heu-
ristic,” in which people make assessments based on what they already
ties”).  A data set like this would allow ready comparisons to see what interventions
work.
274 See, e.g., id. § 1417(c) (requiring the Secretary of Education to take appropri-
ate action to ensure the confidentiality of any personally identifiable data); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.123 (2010) (requiring states to have policies in place to ensure confidentiality
of personally identifiable information).
275 See supra Part II.D.
276 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 128, at 203–06.  Of course, improved access R
to information would benefit all families, poor or not, but the benefit likely matters
more to poor families, given their generally greater informational disadvantage to
begin with.
277 See id. at 3, 6 (defining a “nudge” as a decision made by a “choice architect”—
someone who “has the responsibility for organizing the context in which people make
decisions”—“that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any
options or significantly changing their economic incentives”).
278 See id. at 4–6 (explaining that libertarian paternalism “strive[s] to design poli-
cies that maintain or increase freedom of choice” while “steer[ing] people’s choices
in directions that will improve their lives”).
279 See supra note 128 (discussing how “anchoring” can lead to poor R
decisionmaking).
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know; here, too, it would be useful to get a broader view of options by
seeing what others have done.280  The danger of overrelying on “rep-
resentativeness” might also be present, if school authorities come up
with options for an IEP by implicitly assuming that the needs of one
student are similar to other demographically similar students, where
demographics should not be a relevant factor.281  School authorities
may be subject to the “overconfidence bias,” in which people are
unrealistically optimistic about their abilities, and the “status quo
bias,” in which people tend to maintain the existing state of affairs
regardless of whether it is correct, both of which may hinder their
ability to see the needs of the child before them clearly.282  Reference
to data may facilitate school authorities’ consideration of a broader
range of possibilities.
Third, the database would help reviewing agencies assess whether
districts are really providing adequate services to their lower-income
students.  Below I discuss a proposal for targeted and roving state
review of IEP services for low-income students by district.  This
database would provide a ready way for the state to make its investiga-
tions.  Relatedly, the database could bring new meaning to assess-
ments of adequacy and fairness made by hearing officers in due
process proceedings and mediators in mediation sessions.283  While
the central question would remain what is appropriate for any given
child, information on what other children with similar needs have
been provided would help create an objective range of what is gener-
ally appropriate.
Fourth, the database could lead states to coalesce around appro-
priate service norms, while respecting the federalism values that
280 Cf. id. at 24–26 (explaining that people use the “availability heuristic” when
they “assess the likelihood of risks by asking how readily examples come to mind,” and
noting that the common use of this heuristic tends to lead to biased assessments
because the ready availability of information frequently has little to do with actual
probabilities).
281 Cf. id. at 26–31 (defining “representativeness” as decisionmaking shorthand in
which people assess the likelihood that A belongs to category B “by asking themselves
how similar A is to their image or stereotype of B (that is, how ‘representative’ A is of
B)” and explaining that “biases can creep in when similarity and frequency diverge,”
so that “[u]se of the representativeness heuristic can cause serious misperceptions of
patterns in everyday life”).
282 Cf. id. at 31–35 (describing the dangers associated with each type of bias).
283 Cf. Caruso, supra note 17, at 195–96 (suggesting in passing that “rich R
databases” that permit for some “distributive analysis” would helpfully “inject firmer
guidelines” in individual cases).
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encourage states to experiment.284  States have wildly varying out-
comes now on measures such as the drop-out rate for children with
disabilities and the percentage of time children with disabilities are in
self-contained classrooms (that is, educated separately from children
without disabilities).285  There are currently no formal mechanisms
for states to compare their outcomes to those of other states with ref-
erence to specific types of inputs provided.  The database would pro-
vide a way for states to do so systematically.
b. Assessment of Success and Feasibility
The smaller version of this proposal, simply to add poverty to the
list of factors that are disaggregated in the annual reporting of data, is
not likely to be too politically contentious.  Most of the data are read-
ily available, as children need already be identified as eligible for Title
I and free or reduced-price lunch, and No Child Left Behind already
requires disaggregation of test scores by poverty status and disability
(but not the overlap between the two categories).286  To combine
those factors is a logical next step.
The more ambitious proposal for the IEP database is likely to be
more controversial.  One potential concern is that it sounds incredibly
burdensome and expensive to compile a database of six million annu-
ally changing IEPs.  In actuality, though, the proposal would not be as
burdensome as it initially seems.  The information on IEPs already
exists in written form, so the proposal would not call for the collection
of information from scratch.  Similarly, data on student demographics
and school/district statistics already exist.
The most difficult and expensive part would be designing the
architecture for a unified system and inputting the information into
that system.  The difficulty and cost of such projects have not pre-
vented their requirement in related fields in recent years, however.
No Child Left Behind required states to design data systems to track
student progress and teacher effectiveness.287  A federal grant has
already provided fifty-three million dollars to fourteen states for the
development of these data systems,288 and the Commission on NCLB
has proposed an additional one hundred million dollars a year for
284 Cf. David J. Hoff, National Standards Gain Steam, EDUC. WK., Mar. 4, 2009, at 1
(describing collaborative state process to develop national education standards).
285 See, e.g., 1 U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., supra note 69, at 205–18 tbls.3-1 to 3-8. R
286 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v) (2006).
287 See Alyson Klein, Effect of Stimulus on NCLB Renewal Mulled, EDUC. WK., Mar. 11,
2009, at 24.
288 COMM’N ON NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND, BEYOND NCLB 142 (2007).
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four years to be disseminated to all states for this purpose.289  On
another scale, the 2009 federal stimulus bill provided nineteen billion
dollars for the development and adoption of electronic health record
systems.290  The cost of the IEP database would likely be closer to the
NCLB system cost than the cost of the health data system, since the
number of children with IEPs is a subset of the number of children
overall, and the IEP system could (and should) piggyback on the sys-
tems that are already being designed to satisfy NCLB requirements.
Start-up costs would be the greatest, as once the system is running the
annual costs would be reduced to inputting the data and keeping the
systems running.  The cost is thus much less than the cost of providing
individual attorneys to each child with a disability, as the annual cost
of the latter would never decline.
A concern on the merits involves privacy.  IEPs contain sensitive
information, and information about student outcomes and family
demographics is similarly subject to confidentiality concerns.  The
database would have to be constructed to ensure that no easily identi-
fiable personal information is available and to limit the possibility of
tracing back details of a given IEP or outcome to any individual.291
Data compromises are of course possible, and the database design
should be sensitive to security issues.292  On this front, it is worth high-
lighting the existence of other government databases containing per-
sonally sensitive information, including other databases with
educational information.293  These other databases may provide mod-
289 Id. at 144.
290 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§§ 13001–13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–79.
291 Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 300.602(b)(3) (2010) (prohibiting states from providing any
information to the federal government or the public on a district’s progress in meet-
ing state requirements if that information would result in disclosure of personally
identifiable information about individual children).
292 In particular, regulators should consider the five factors identified by Paul
Ohm for assessing the risk of reidentification and for designing systems to reduce that
risk: data-handling techniques, the extent of the release of data, the quantity of data
released, the motive for reidentification, and trust in people or institutions who might
be interested in the data.  Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Sur-
prising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1764–69 (2010).
293 In addition to the new commitment of the federal government to make availa-
ble to the public government data on a never before seen scale at www.data.gov, there
are a number of large-scale federal education databases that are not open to the pub-
lic but that are used for various other reasons.  For example, the Department of
Defense maintains a national recruiting database that includes students’ names, date
of birth, gender, ethnicity, and GPA.  Lynn M. Daggett, FERPA in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury: Failure to Effectively Regulate Privacy for All Students, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 103–04
(2008).  The Department of Education maintains a database of information, includ-
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els in how (or how not) to proceed.294  Similarly, lessons from the
current move towards electronic health records may also be
applicable.295
Another objection might be that the proposal for an IEP database
would not do enough to solve the problems with enforcement for the
poor.  Even armed with more knowledge, people may not pursue
claims for a variety of reasons discussed above;296 additionally, those
who might most benefit from the knowledge might be least likely or
able to use the database to obtain it.297  This is indeed a limitation,
underscoring the importance of affirmative government action to
enforce the law for poor children.  Because the database would still be
useful to schools in designing IEPs, reviewing agencies assessing the
quality of special education programs, and state players comparing
notes, however, the database would still provide value to families in
poverty even if they never consult it themselves.
ing Social Security numbers, on sixty million students for financial aid purposes,
which lenders are permitted to access. See id. at 104.  The Department of Education
has also supported the establishment of a national database to track student perform-
ance over time as a way of evaluating the accomplishments of colleges and universi-
ties. See id.  Separately, data on school-level and grade-level performance on state
tests, among other information, is available to the public at www.city-data.com.
294 See generally Daggett, supra note 293 (suggesting ways to improve protection of R
student privacy in such databases).  In late 2010, the Education Department created
the Privacy Technical Assistance Center to help “education stakeholders to learn
about data privacy, confidentiality, and security practices related to student-level lon-
gitudinal data systems.” See Privacy Technical Assistance Center, NAT’L CENTER EDUC.
STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/programs/Ptac/OtherResources.aspx (last visited June
13, 2011); see also Sarah D. Sparks, Help Offered on Guarding Student Privacy in School
Data, EDUC. WK., Nov. 10, 2010.  As this Article went to press, the Education Depart-
ment had just issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking setting forth proposed amend-
ments to the regulations implementing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(“FERPA”) and announced that it had hired its first Chief Privacy Officer. See Family
Educational Rights and Privacy, 76 Fed. Reg. 19726 (proposed Apr. 8, 2011) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 99); U.S. Education Department Launches Initiatives to Safeguard
Student Privacy, ED.GOV (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-
education-department-launches-initiatives-safeguard-student-privacy.  These actions
both demonstrate the prevalence of data systems in contemporary education practice
and underscore the serious attention given to protecting student privacy in such data
systems.
295 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyber-
space: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331,
344–84 (2007).
296 See supra Part II.D.
297 Cf. Sunstein, supra note 260, at 628 (“Disclosure strategies may also have dis- R
proportionately little effect on people who are undereducated, elderly, or poor.”).
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2. Monitoring and Investigation
a. Design Details
Monitoring and detecting violations of the law are important reg-
ulatory strategies that can obviate the need for more serious enforce-
ment action.298  The act of having to produce information to
regulators can induce compliance.299  In turn, agencies can best target
their investigative resources based on assessments of the information
produced.300
The state enforcement system under the IDEA currently monitors
local school districts for compliance with various requirements of the
law.  This system could be expanded to include a role for affirmative
compliance investigations into the quality of FAPE provided in poor
children’s IEPs.  The state agency would assess a series of IEPs in
targeted locations and among students where the demographics are
unlikely to result in either a due process hearing request or a state
complaint.  Locations where outcomes for children with disabilities
are particularly low could be one trigger to provoke an investigation
into inputs in the form of services on IEPs.301  Other possibilities
would be to target districts serving primarily low-income students,
where there might be reason to believe that fewer parents would raise
claims on their children’s behalf, or districts with a high degree of
socioeconomic stratification, where there might be reason to believe
that parents with greater financial resources were skewing the special
education budget towards their children and away from lower-income
children.  Different states could work out how to target their investiga-
tions each year, given how differently state education systems are
organized, but some basic guidelines should exist.  For example, to
keep districts from getting complacent after an investigation, states
probably should not engage in a strict rotation through every district
over a period of years.  Similarly, a minimum number of investigations
should be required, perhaps as a percentage range of students with
IEPs.
These investigations could take at least two forms.  At the most
basic level, the state agency could simply review IEPs on their own
terms without making any comparisons to other IEPs.  This is the cur-
298 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1012 (6th ed. 2009).
299 See NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY WITH DARREN SINCLAIR, SMART REGU-
LATION 430 (1998).
300 See id.
301 The IDEA amendments of 2006 included a new focus on student outcomes.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(2), (b)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); Ramanathan, supra note
254, at 283. R
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rent model in due process hearings.  To do this, the agency either
could review all of the evaluation data that went into the drafting of
the IEPs or could further order an additional independent evaluation
as a way of spot-checking the original assessments.  This additional
step would be of particular value where the parents were in no finan-
cial position to pay for such an independent evaluation themselves
and so were reliant on the school’s evaluations.  Where the state
found that IEPs were inadequate, it would require IEP meetings to be
reconvened to make changes to individual students’ IEPs on the
threat of withholding funds from noncompliant districts.  There could
be an appeal process, but the process need not be particularly formal
or require a hearing, as states are obligated under the IDEA to ensure
that districts are appropriately implementing the law, and districts
exist as creatures of the state.302
A more ambitious version of such a compliance review would con-
sist of comparisons between the IEPs of low-income and high-income
students in the same district.303  While the process of evaluating FAPE
for a given child is, as a legal matter in a private action, currently an
individual inquiry in which comparisons to other children are irrele-
vant,304 there are problems with the discretion associated with such
individual inquiries, as wealthier families may be better able to advo-
cate for the provision of greater services than can low-income fami-
lies.305  A state investigation into the possibility of such differential
services would temper this possibility.  The review should be intradis-
trict because wealthier districts may within the confines of the law
decide to provide services that go beyond FAPE, so comparing IEPs of
similarly situated students from district to district would capture too
much.306  But there is no reason that wealthier students within a dis-
302 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11).  This is in contrast to the opportunities for formal
hearings offered by the federal Department of Education to private entities and dis-
tricts in OCR’s enforcement of various civil rights laws, see 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)
(2010); OCR Case Processing Manual, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcpm.html (last visited June 13, 2011), and to states in the
Office for Special Education Program’s enforcement of the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C.
§ 1416(c)–(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
303 Data on children who are eligible for Title I funding or who receive free or
reduced-price school lunches, as well as data on school per-pupil expenditures, would
be among the possible factors to compare.
304 See, e.g., Hupp v. Switz. of Ohio Local Sch. Dist., No. 2:07-CV-628, 2008 WL
2323783, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2008); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.615 (stating that
parents have right to see special education records only for their child).
305 See supra Part II.
306 States can require schools to provide more than the floor of FAPE that the
IDEA requires.  In practice, however, courts generally interpret state statutes that
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trict should receive superior services than do lower-income students
within that same district simply because of family socioeconomics.
What would these comparative reviews look like?  Similar to the
investigations that the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) has conducted to attempt to eradicate racial disparities in spe-
cial education, this comparative review would examine wealth-based
overrepresentation and disparate receipt of services within certain dis-
ability categories.307  For example, as to the question of overrepresen-
tation and appropriate diagnosis, the review would examine
differential placement in the notoriously slippery categories of learn-
ing disabilities and behavioral or emotional disorders.308  Are wealth-
ier children receiving the relatively less stigmatic learning disability
diagnosis while poor children are receiving the relatively more stig-
matic diagnosis of a behavioral or emotional disorder?  As to the ques-
tion of differential services within the same disability category, the
review might examine whether wealthier children with learning disa-
bilities are receiving an in-class aide and several hours in a resource
room while poor children receive a self-contained class.  In the same
vein, the review would also compare students receiving private place-
ments at public expense to determine whether they have different
socioeconomic profiles than students in the regular public school sys-
tem.  For example, are wealthier students more likely than poor chil-
dren to obtain public payment for education at a private school
focusing on learning disabilities or autism?309  The goal would be to
identify disparate treatment or disparate impact by socioeconomic
class that is not educationally justified.
Where disparities that were not educationally justified were
found, the state would order IEP meetings to be reconvened so that
changes to individual students’ IEPs could be made and would also
require whatever broader systemic changes were required to limit the
possibility of the problems of disparities continuing.  As with all
equity-based decisions, a choice would have to be made whether to
seem to require maximizing a child’s potential to be something closer to the lower
federal floor. See, e.g., KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17, at 54–55; Stephen A. Rosen- R
baum, Full Sp[ ]Ed Ahead: Expanding the IDEA Idea to Let All Students Ride the Same Bus, 4
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 373, 382 n.46 (2008).
307 See Theresa Glennon, Evaluating the Office for Civil Rights’ Minority and Special
Education Project, in RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, supra note 17, at 195. R
308 See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17, at 17–36, 67–92. R
309 Cf. Juan Gonzalez, Class System in the City’s Schools: Special-Ed Help Goes Mostly to
the Rich, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 15, 2010, at 6 (reporting that most of New York City’s
special education students supported by public funding in private schools are from
the city’s wealthiest neighborhoods).
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level up or level down: Should wealthier students receive the lower
amount that poor children do, or should poor children receive the
higher amount that wealthier children do?  Leveling up is the better
option as a substantive matter, and it is also more likely as both a prac-
tical and a political matter.
As a substantive matter, leveling up provides an opportunity to
improve the quality of special education services provided to low-
income children.  As explained above, educational outcomes for poor
children with disabilities have essentially remained flat over several
decades, while educational outcomes for wealthier children with disa-
bilities have dramatically increased.310  Reducing the services provided
to wealthier children would fix the equity problem but would do noth-
ing to improve educational outcomes for poor children.  Because the
IDEA is supposed to “improv[e] educational results and functional
outcomes for all children with disabilities,”311 it would make little
sense to design the new system to undercut this goal.
The practical dynamic would also likely lead to some degree of
leveling up.  It is difficult to envision a scenario in which services that
the IEP team had agreed were appropriate for a wealthier child could
be taken away from that child simply because another child for whom
those services were newly deemed appropriate had not previously had
them.  The removal of those services would also likely trigger a request
for a due process hearing or the filing of a state complaint.  Similarly,
to the extent that districts might be inclined to level down over time,
due process hearings or complaints brought by wealthier families
could put pressure against that trend.
Finally, as a political matter, leveling up presents the only viable
strategy, given what I have already explained about the political econ-
omy of the statute.312  It is easy to see how wealthier parents of chil-
dren with disabilities might advocate for statutory changes that would
permit otherwise similarly situated poor children with disabilities to
have access to the same benefits their own children do.313  It is diffi-
cult to see how wealthier parents would advocate for changes that
would simply give their own children less.314  These comparative
reviews could be an important strategy to tie the fates of poor children
310 See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. R
311 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(2) (2006).
312 See supra notes 231–34 and accompanying text. R
313 Cf. Lester, supra note 231, at 26–28 (summarizing social psychology research R
finding that people are likely to be more generous towards members of their own
social group and noting that design of programs can affect how people define what
their own social group is).
314 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. R
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with disabilities to the fates of wealthier children with disabilities, but
tying strategies that do not threaten the status quo of people in power
are more likely to succeed.315
b. Assessment of Success and Feasibility
This proposal would go a long way to addressing intradistrict dis-
parities in the provision of services.  It would not, however, solve state-
to-state or district-to-district disparities in services, and the failure to
address those other disparities might cause some to complain that it is
not doing enough.  Children in less wealthy Boston may still receive
worse special education services than children in wealthier Wellesley,
while children in less wealthy Louisiana may still receive worse special
education services than children in wealthier Massachusetts.  Unless
we are willing to give up the idea that local school systems have pri-
mary responsibility for designing their own education programs,
though, there is no way to ensure that the actual services all children
with like disabilities receive will be comparable.  The commitment to
localism in our national education policy is so strong that giving up
that idea does not seem plausible.  Even if it were plausible in princi-
ple, it is difficult to see how special education could be the tail that
wagged the dog in this respect.  To insist that children with disabilities
in Boston receive the same level of services as children with disabilities
in Wellesley, while resisting the idea that all children in Boston should
receive the same level of services as all children in Wellesley, would
likely prompt backlash against special education that it would be
unwise to pursue.
There is nevertheless value in remedying intradistrict disparities.
The goal of the proposal is to make sure that the law is not under-
enforced, even in its local incarnations, in certain areas of the country
and for certain types of students.  To require districts to treat their
students with disabilities equitably, regardless of their socioeconomic
background, is not nothing.  Indeed, this proposal is in keeping with
the latest research into school finance inequities, which shows that
district budgeting practices that are permitted and even encouraged
by federal law are able to mask intradistrict inequities and fund richer
schools at the expense of poorer schools.316  Calls for federal law to
315 See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
316 See, e.g., Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Within-District Spending Inequities
Help Some Schools to Fail, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION POLICY 201, 213–16
(Diane Ravitch ed., 2004); Marguerite Roza et al., Strengthening Title I to Help High-
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remedy these intradistrict inequities are increasing.317  The proposal
for intradistrict examination of IEPs thus reaches an important new
focus in education disparities.
A second concern might be that the proposal focuses only on
children who are already in the special education system.  It does not
address those children who have been tested for special education ser-
vices and improperly found ineligible or those who have never been
tested at all but who would be properly found eligible if they were.
This is indeed a limitation of the proposal.  However, states could
choose to consider evaluation data of children not currently served by
special education to ensure that evaluations do not result in dispari-
ties by class.  In any event, there is an already existing statutory obliga-
tion for each state to find every child with a disability,318 making any
effort to include this focus in the compliance reviews less crucial.
A third concern might be that private attorneys would do the job
better than the state would.  Assuming that providing attorneys to
every child is implausible but that pilot programs in particular juris-
dictions might be possible, is the proposal for state review better than
that?  The answer is yes.  If private attorneys are offered in particular
districts, their effect would remain only in those districts.  While they
would benefit children in those districts, their spillover effect would
be limited.  In contrast, state review would move from district to dis-
trict and possibly back again, so it would have more potential to spur
improvement in a greater number of districts.  In addition, it would
be harder for private attorneys than for the government to obtain all
of the comparative data necessary to encourage equalization.319  The
state can more easily require districts to open up their data on IEPs
Poverty Schools: How Title I Funds Fit into District Allocation Patterns 5–6 (Aug. 18,
2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
317 See, e.g., LINDSEY LUEBCHOW, EQUITABLE RESOURCES IN LOW INCOME SCHOOLS
(2009), available at http://education.newamerica.net/site/newamerica.net/files/pol-
icydocs/Equitable_Resources_Low_Income_Schools.pdf; THE EDUCATION TRUST—
WEST, CALIFORNIA’S HIDDEN TEACHER SPENDING GAP (2005), available at  http://www.
hiddengap.org/resources/report031105.pdf; Alyson Klein, Lawmakers Introduce Bill
Aimed at “Fiscal Fairness,” EDUC. WK: POLITICS K-12 (Mar. 31, 2011, 3:36 PM), http://
blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2011/03/salary_comparability_could_fin.
html?qs=salary+comparability; Alyson Klein, Salary Comparability: Coming to an ESEA
Bill Near You?, EDUC. WK.: POLITICS K-12 (Oct. 4, 2010, 2:44 PM), http://blogs.
edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2010/10/salary_comparability_coming_so.html.
318 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3) (2006).
319 See Selmi, supra note 5, at 1458; Daniel J. Losen, Note, Silent Segregation in Our R
Nation’s Schools, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 538 (1999).
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for a government investigation, while private attorneys would likely
face opposition against a fishing expedition.320
A fourth concern is that there is no real advantage to substituting
the professional judgment of state education officials for the profes-
sional judgment of local education officials.  In both cases, officials
will be sensitive to cost concerns and so may try to get away with pro-
viding as little as possible.  This is a variation on the previous concern,
in that if this is an accurate description, only individualized advocates
could get around this problem.  I think this problem is not as great as
it might at first seem, however, because ultimately local districts bear
the costs of education.  States tend to contribute to local education
spending under a formula but are less sensitive to what the cost of any
individual child’s IEP will be, so may examine the data more dispas-
sionately.321  This would be especially true if the monitoring is con-
ducted through a separate inspector-general-like unit of the state
department of education.322  States, too, are subject to withdrawal of
federal funds if they do not appropriately implement the IDEA, so to
the extent that the federal government reviews their work in these
compliance reviews, they have an incentive to ensure that they are not
simply rubberstamping local decisionmaking.  Similarly, there are
fewer institutional competence questions with respect to state officials
reviewing IEPs than there are with district judges in a putative IDEA
class action comparing IEPs, since the expertise of state agency offi-
cials would be more akin to the expertise of state hearing officers in
due process hearings.
A fifth concern might point to the efforts of the Office for Civil
Rights to remedy race discrimination in special education, which have
not been spectacularly successful.323  Both my proposal and OCR’s
work on this front involve examinations of school district treatment of
disadvantaged populations receiving special education services, so the
comparison is not unfair.  While OCR’s work has been stymied by a
variety of structural, tactical, and administrative issues, some of these
320 See supra Part III.D.
321 See, e.g., Heubert, supra note 141, at 316, 319.  This response does not apply to R
the District of Columbia and the state of Hawaii, neither of which has local school
districts. DAVID C. THOMPSON ET AL., MONEY AND SCHOOLS 89 (4th ed. 2008).
322 Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and Exter-
nal Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 429 (2009) (describing the role of inspec-
tors general as insulated from substantive agency work and politics and thereby
helping to “ensure regularity and the rule of law”).
323 OCR’s investigations stem from its enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which bans recipients of federal funds (including school districts and state
education departments) from engaging in race discrimination. See supra note 17. R
OCR does not enforce the IDEA. See Glennon, supra note 307, at 195. R
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issues are specific to the design of OCR and so will not be relevant
here, and others provide instructive lessons to make my proposal work
more smoothly.324  Among the problems OCR faced in its review were
an extremely broad mission—encompassing discrimination on the
basis of race, national origin, gender, disability, and age, in colleges
and universities as well as in K-12 schools—and a decentralized
enforcement structure, encompassing ten different regions with dif-
ferent priorities.325  Individual state agencies with divisions focusing
solely on special education enforcement will be able to be more
targeted and unified in their approach.  Another OCR problem lay in
its enforcement authority: where it found a violation of Title VI and
the school district refused to modify its practices voluntarily, its only
available penalty was to cut off all federal financial assistance, an
option so dramatic that its threat is rarely credible.326  In contrast,
states whose constituent school districts refuse to comply have many
options, including actually taking over the district, and thus ultimately
a good deal more power.
At the same time, some lessons from OCR’s work are applicable.
The impact of OCR’s district-by-district reviews was not broad because
OCR did not publicize its reviews or resulting agreements, post guide-
lines for districts that were not currently under review, or work with
nongovernmental agencies who might have assisted its efforts.327  It is
important that state agencies conducting compliance reviews engage
in these activities.  In addition, inadequate resources hampered
OCR’s efforts to fully investigate all of the complaints it received and
to proactively conduct compliance reviews.328  Budgetary constraints
are a concern here as well.  The proposal to mandate a certain num-
ber or range of compliance reviews each year is one way to limit the
potential for complaint investigation to trump such reviews.
This reference to budgetary constraints marks an appropriate
transition to the question of political feasibility, for just as the propo-
sal to provide attorneys to all children with disabilities is prohibitively
expensive to be realistic, the proposal for IEP compliance reviews
would not be realistic if its expense is too great.  There are two kinds
of expenses one might consider: the cost of the compliance reviews
themselves and the increased expense from additional services added
to previously inadequate IEPs as a result of the compliance reviews.
324 See id. at 201–09.
325 See id. at 202.
326 See id. at 203.
327 See id. at 204.
328 See id. at 206.
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This latter cost would, of course, be an issue with the proposal to pro-
vide attorneys at public expense as well, so the latter cost cannot dis-
tinguish that proposal from this one.
Considering simply the cost of the compliance reviews them-
selves, some of the cost could piggyback on the cost of the data sys-
tems proposed in the previous subsection.  Once the data are already
gathered and reviewable, and given the role that state agency staff
already play in district oversight, the incremental cost of investigations
would likely be the cost of additional full-time employees in each state
to run the investigations.  As a point of comparison, OCR’s annual
budget is approximately ninety million dollars, funding around 600
full-time employees in twelve regional offices and the Washington,
D.C. headquarters, who both process complaints and conduct compli-
ance reviews.329  Because state education department staff already
exist to process complaints under the IDEA and otherwise oversee the
administration of the program, perhaps roughly half this amount, or
$45 million, would be a reasonable expectation for the annual added
expense of state-level education department staff to conduct compli-
ance reviews under this proposal.
Some might argue that this is money that should better be spent
on providing special education services rather than conducting com-
pliance reviews, and the point has some force; the point is also made
with respect to due process proceedings.330  But where there is a dan-
ger that that money would be spent disproportionately on children
from wealthier families and in wealthier areas, the idea that service
provision trumps enforcement is not neutral.  In addition, current
spending on monitoring and enforcement is already costly, so it is not
as if this kind of spending is itself a new and controversial idea.
Finally, the idea of providing adequate funds to a government agency
to enforce the law is likely less divisive than the idea of providing pri-
vate attorneys for individuals.  Thus, this incremental cost is not likely
to spell the proposal’s doom.
329 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS 3 (2008).
330 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, ‘Transaction Costs’ and the IDEA, EDUC. WK., May 21,
2003, at 34.  In that regard, however, it is worth noting that responding to the private
enforcement system appears not to pose an unwieldy financial burden on school dis-
tricts in comparison with expenditures on special education overall.  By one calcula-
tion, school districts’ expenditures on procedural activity are less than one half of one
percent of total expenditures on special education. See Chambers et al., supra note
43, at 5 (estimating that school districts spent approximately $146.5 million on special R
education mediation, due process, and litigation in 1999–2000, compared to approxi-
mately fifty billion dollars on special education overall).
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Calculating the increased annual expense of adding services as a
result of the compliance reviews is a trickier matter, because without
data of the type I propose above, more guesswork as to the depth of
inadequate service provision is required.  One very rough estimate
might compare the gap between what districts serving the lowest-
income families spend on average each year to educate a student with
a disability and what districts serving wealthier families do and multi-
ply this gap by the approximate number of poor children with disabili-
ties.  Such a calculation would be imperfect, because my proposal
envisions an intradistrict, rather than an interdistrict, comparison,
and because it is unlikely that the quality of services provided to every
low-income child would require such remediation.  Still, as a ballpark
figure, perhaps on the high side, the number is instructive: around
$2.8 billion dollars.331
Of course this is a large number in comparison with the twelve
billion dollars annually spent by the federal government on special
education (although less so in comparison to the fifty billion dollars
spent annually on special education overall).332  Put in context of the
politics of special education funding, however, it is nonetheless plausi-
ble that this additional money could be forthcoming from the federal
government.  In contrast to the rest of federal education spending,
which is often treated as suspect by Republican members of Congress,
federal spending on special education has a decades-long history of
widespread cross-party support.333  In recent history, for example, the
Bush administration oversaw significant increases in federal spending
on special education, from about eight percent of total spending on
special education to about eighteen percent.334  Even more recently,
federal funding for special education remained untouched in the pro-
posal of the Republican Study Committee in early 2011 to reduce fed-
eral spending by $2.5 trillion by 2021, which called for many other
federal funding streams for education to be eliminated.335  Similarly,
the budget compromise in April 2011 kept special education intact
331 I calculated this figure using a spending gap of $2314 per child with a disabil-
ity. See Chambers et al., supra note 64, at 7.  Referring to estimates of the percentage R
of low-income children with disabilities, supra note 88 and accompanying text, I then R
multiplied this spending gap by twenty percent of six million children.
332 For these two cost figures, see supra notes 23, 330 R
333 See MELNICK, supra note 43, at 150; Alyson Klein, K-12 Policy Shifts Loom in GOP R
Surge, ED. WEEK, Sept. 16, 2010; Pasachoff, supra note 23, at 29. R
334 See Pasachoff, supra note 23, at 27. R
335 See Spending Reduction Act of 2011, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE, http://
rsc.jordan.house.gov/Solutions/SRA.htm (last visited June 13, 2011).
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even as Congress cut thirty-eight billion dollars elsewhere from the
federal budget.336
There is also a broad political coalition in support of so-called
“full funding” of special education, a movement that refers to the
stated goal (some call it a promise) in the original legislation that the
federal government would provide forty percent of special education
funding.337  Powerful legislators of both parties have periodically (and
recently) either called for or proposed legislation that would provide
full funding, which, for fiscal year 2011, the 2004 reauthorization set
at twenty-six billion dollars.338  Some of this legislation has made it
relatively far through the legislative process.339  Identifying $2.8 bil-
lion dollars as specifically intended to improve services for low-income
children with disabilities might help make the need for such funds
more concrete and thus more politically possible, especially if framed
as a middle option between no increase in special education funding
and an increase that would lead to full funding.340
One might reasonably query why any increased federal education
money should be spent on special education services for the poor
rather than simply on education for the poor in general.  I hasten to
emphasize that my purpose here is not to justify special education
funding over other education funding, or indeed over other social
welfare funding or other completely different uses for the public fisc;
my frame of reference is internal to the IDEA rather than a compara-
tive budgetary analysis.  That having been said, several points are
worth noting as to federal funding of special education in comparison
to federal funding of general education for the poor.
First, increasing federal funding for special education is not
entirely a zero-sum game because of a statutory provision that permits
336 See H.R. 1473, 112th Cong. (2011); HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMM., SUMMARY—
FINAL FISCAL YEAR 2011 CONTINUING RESOLUTION (2011), available at http://appropri-
ations.house.gov/_files/41211SummaryFinalFY2011CR.pdf (explaining that the Con-
tinuing Resolution “preserves funding for . . . special education”); Jennifer Cohen,
Congress Close to Finalizing Fiscal Year 2011 Appropriations, ED MONEY WATCH (April 12,
2011), http://edmoney.newamerica.net/blogposts/2011/congress_close_to_finaliz-
ing_fiscal_year_2011_appropriations-48348 (noting that the budget bill cut approxi-
mately $1.3 billion from the Education Department budget but that funding for
special education remained “unscathed”).
337 See Pasachoff, supra note 23, at 27–28. R
338 See id. at 28; see also IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1652, 111th Cong. (2009); Every-
one Deserves Unconditional Access to Education Act, H.R. 3578, 111th Cong. (2009).
339 See Pasachoff, supra note 23, at 28. R
340 Cf. Steven Pearlstein, The Compromise Effect, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at H01
(explaining that people often select the middle option because it seems more reason-
able than either extreme).
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states and districts to shift some of their own spending towards gen-
eral education services as federal funding for special education
increases.341  Poor children without disabilities may thus benefit from
increased state and local spending as federal spending on special edu-
cation grows.
Second, to the extent that the argument that more spending is
needed for general education is rooted in a belief that spending on
general education is more likely to improve educational outcomes
overall, it bears observing that the vast majority of children served by
the IDEA do not need the most expensive interventions in order to
achieve on par with their peers.  Close to fifty percent of the children
served by the IDEA are classified as learning disabled, with close to
twenty percent as having speech and language impairments and close
to ten percent as having emotional disturbance.342  Implementing
appropriate services for these children could quite realistically help
these children perform on grade level with relatively reasonably
priced services.  This is not to say that it is not important to fund
expensive interventions or that performing on grade level is the only
important value under the IDEA or for education more generally.
But because meeting state standards is one of the goals of federal edu-
cation spending, even in special education, recognizing the relatively
low-cost needs of the majority of children served under the IDEA sug-
gests the potential for dramatic improvements in a cost-effective way.
Third, implementing appropriate services for children with disa-
bilities can have an important spillover effect for other, nondisabled
children in their classrooms and their schools.  Children whose educa-
tional needs are being met are less likely to act out in school, improv-
ing the educational environment for everyone.
Finally, given the unusual politics of special education funding,343
it may simply be easier as a political matter to obtain more federal
funding for special education that could then be used to improve ser-
vices for low-income children with disabilities than it would be to
obtain more federal funding for general education for low-income
children without disabilities.  The broad coalition of those supporting
full funding of the IDEA suggests that organizations that are not spe-
cifically devoted to special education nonetheless see little conflict
between supporting full funding of the IDEA and caring about poor
children more generally.344  For all of these reasons, directing addi-
341 See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(C), (j) (2006); Pasachoff, supra note 23, at 28. R
342 See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 23, at 30. R
343 See supra note 333 and accompanying text. R
344 See Pasachoff, supra note 23, at 29. R
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tional funds into compliance reviews to ensure better services for low-
income children with disabilities seems not only worthwhile but also
realistically possible.345
3. Financial Incentives
a. Design Details
The premise of a spending clause program like the IDEA is that
Congress can impose conditions on the states in exchange for provid-
ing funding and can take those funds away when it is dissatisfied with
the states’ performance.346  Targeted use of this carrot-and-stick
power could improve enforcement of the Act for poor children.
Congress has given enforcement authority under the IDEA to the
Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) in the Department of
Education.347  OSEP has the authority to target the funds it wishes to
withhold from the particular programs, projects, or agencies that are
not in compliance, rather than withholding funds from the state as a
whole.348  OSEP is also subject to a series of statutory triggers that
mandate OSEP enforcement activity upon certain findings.  Under
these triggers, if OSEP determines that a state needs assistance in
implementing the IDEA, needs intervention, or needs substantial
intervention (all terms of art), it must choose from a limited range of
options, which include directing the use of state funds, withholding or
recovering federal funds, and referring the matter to the Department
of Justice for enforcement action.349
Congress could require that a state providing (or permitting its
districts to provide) worse special education services to poor children
than to wealthier children would not be in compliance with the law.
This directive could take either of two forms.  One option would be to
345 Even if the current budgetary climate makes a large increase in federal spend-
ing on special education less likely in the immediate future, the long arc of the polit-
ics of special education funding suggests that increased federal funding for special
education is a favored priority.  Moreover, because of the vast difference in adminis-
trative costs between providing individual advocates for private enforcement and cre-
ating these proposed monitoring and compliance reviews, such reviews remain a
more realistically possible proposal.
346 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See generally James E. Ryan, The
Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of Education Governance, in
WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? 42 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004) (discussing power of the Spend-
ing Clause in federal education programs).
347 See 20 U.S.C. § 1402a.
348 See id. § 1416(e)(6)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see also Hehir, supra note 254, R
at 229.
349 See 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(1)–(3); Ramanathan, supra note 254, at 283–84. R
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require the same degree of excellence in special education services in
every district around the state.  To avoid the concern of leveling down,
it could instruct that the services provided to wealthier children are
the baseline and should not be lessened.  This would be akin to the
“maintenance of effort” provisions included in the IDEA and other
federal education programs, ensuring that states and local districts do
not substitute additional federal dollars for their own spending by
requiring that they maintain their level of spending.350  Another,
weaker alternative would require only that individual districts not pro-
vide better services to wealthier children than to poor children.  This
alternative would be in keeping with the Act’s focus on local control,
accepting that districts are permitted to provide more than FAPE if
they want, but underscoring that within a district, what constitutes
FAPE should not be worse for poor children than for wealthier
children.
Although it is not a necessary outgrowth of the two previous pro-
posals, such a mandate could fit easily with them.  States providing
data demonstrating harmful disproportionality for poor children
would have to demonstrate improvement or be subject to the statutory
triggers.  Similarly, states conducting good faith compliance investiga-
tions into the substance of IEPs would meet part of their burden
under the mandate; if they continually had difficulty ensuring equali-
zation, they might be characterized as needing assistance, interven-
tion, or substantial intervention, subject to the statutory triggers.
States not conducting good faith investigations or permitting recalci-
trant districts to avoid their duties under the mandate would face the
statutory triggers earlier.
Alternatively, instead of threatening to take funds away, Congress
could provide additional funds to states (and through them districts)
that are taking steps to ensure that poor children are provided with
services as good as those provided to wealthier children—for exam-
ple, by reporting annual declines in measures of disproportionality.
This proposal would be in line with recent attention to the way the
IDEA federal funding stream reaches children in poverty.  In 2004,
Congress revised the formula for awarding IDEA funds to the states to
include a small measure of poverty, so that a percentage of any addi-
tional funds over the previous year’s award is dependent on each
state’s relative share of children living in poverty.351  The formula
does not take into account specific state efforts to serve those children
equitably, however.  A new incentive grant could do so.  One model
350 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(18)(A), 1413(j)(5) (2006).
351 See id. § 1411(a)(2)(B).
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might be the Education Finance Incentive Grants under No Child
Left Behind, which provide an additional amount on top of the base
grant in part by taking into account how equitably school funding is
distributed across districts in a state.352  These grants were first author-
ized in 1994, in the predecessor statute to NCLB, but they were not
funded until NCLB was passed in 2001.353  Since then, these grants
have been growing dramatically, now constituting almost a quarter of
all Title I funding.354
b. Assessment of Success and Feasibility
Mandating equalization of special education services across dis-
tricts in a state seems politically implausible for a variety of reasons,
including longstanding commitments to local control and experimen-
tation in education.  More promising is the proposal for a mandate
that districts do not provide better services to their wealthier students
than to their poor students without educational justification, a princi-
ple of fairness that raises few concerns on its face.  Given Congress’s
growing interest in including a poverty factor in IDEA funding and an
equity factor in Title I funding, providing incentive grants for equali-
zation might be politically plausible, as might the more traditional
threat of a funding cut-off.
One potential objection might be that for other demographic fac-
tors for which the IDEA requires disaggregated data, there is no threat
of a funding cut-off if findings of disproportion are found.  In fact, for
disparities in gender and Limited English Proficiency status, no reper-
cussions are mandated at all; where disparities in race and ethnicity
are found, the only repercussions are that the state should review and
possibly revise the district’s policies and require the district to reserve
the maximum amount of funding possible to provide early interven-
tion services to children before they begin school.355  It might not
make sense to let poverty be a trigger for a funding cut-off if these
other demographic factors are not.  One response is that the Office
for Civil Rights, through its enforcement of Title VI, has, in fact,
threatened funding cut-offs based on racial disproportionality in spe-
cial education, so perhaps the absence of this threat in the IDEA sim-
352 See id. § 6337.
353 See New Am. Found., Federal Education Budget Project: No Child Left Behind Act—
Title I School Funding Equity Factor, FED. EDUC. BUDGET PROJECT, http://
febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/no-child-left-behind-act-title-i-school-fund-
ing-equity-factor (last visited June 13, 2011).
354 See id.
355 See 20 U.S.C. § 1418(d).
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ply represents a division of labor between the agencies.356  Another
response might be that effective enforcement of the IDEA should
actually require funding cut-offs based on unjustified disproportion in
all of these demographics, and that a funding cut-off for poverty dis-
proportion could be a useful beginning.
A separate concern might be that historically, OSEP has not used
its enforcement power particularly broadly, permitting states to be in
violation of the IDEA for years.357  Adding yet another factor that
OSEP could consider and yet take no action on would not likely pro-
duce change.  However, the triggers mandating action based on cer-
tain findings (which were put in place in the 2004 reauthorization)
combined with the ability to withhold targeted funds instead of funds
from an entire state (which was put in place in the 1997 reauthoriza-
tion) make it easier for OSEP to take action.358  Moreover, there
might be value in a mandate towards which state systems can strive,
regardless of the likelihood of a formal OSEP enforcement action.
Even imperfect implementation of the mandate could be better for
children in poverty than not having the mandate at all.
V. ENFORCING STATUTORY RIGHTS BEYOND THE IDEA
The enforcement problem I have identified in the IDEA is gener-
alizable.  Where a statute shares certain features with the IDEA, heavy
reliance on private action can lead to predictable disparities in
enforcement to the detriment of people without financial resources.
These features include the distribution of resources among a
socioeconomically diverse group; an individualized right that depends
on bargaining to be effectuated; discretion in determining the con-
tours of the right; and a lack of transparency in that determination.
Two broad lessons emerge from this insight.  First, where the rel-
evant public policy does not intend for wealthier beneficiaries to
obtain a greater share of the statute’s distributed resources than poor
beneficiaries do, public enforcement mechanisms focusing on both
356 See Glennon, supra note 323, at 195. R
357 See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 237, at 7, 53; Hehir, supra note
254, at 222; Ramanathan, supra note 254, at 290. R
358 Because funding cutoffs to an entire state were so draconian, OSEP had been
reluctant to use this option; the option for partial withholding was supposed to make
using this option more palatable.  Because the threat of withholding often brought
political controversy, where state officials would lobby their federal representatives to
put pressure on the administration to stop any withholding consideration, the
mandatory triggers, part of the 2004 reauthorization, were designed to insulate OSEP
from political pressure. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 357, at 11; R
Hehir, supra note 254, at 224–30; Ramanathan, supra note 254, at 289–91. R
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adequacy and equity may be necessary in order to effectuate the stat-
ute’s goals.  Consider, for example, access to non-means-tested gov-
ernment-sponsored health care programs, such as Medicare (serving
individuals over the age of sixty-five)359 and the Military Health System
and Veterans Health Administration (serving military personnel, vet-
erans, and their families).360  The structure of these programs may
contain the potential for unintentional inequitable distribution of ser-
vices without medical justification (and without additional payment
according to means).  At least in theory, differential bargaining
power, professional discretion over appropriate treatment, and a lack
of transparency in what services are provided may lead to better ser-
vices for wealthier individuals.  In turn, it may be hard for low-income
individuals to know what services similarly situated wealthy individuals
have received; there may be few positive externalities from wealthy
patients’ individual advocacy361 while the pool of available money may
limit services for low-income patients; and the transaction costs associ-
ated with pursuing claims over denials may be more difficult to over-
come for low-income patients than for wealthy patients.  It might
therefore be useful to consider ways to develop public enforcement
strategies such as informational regulation, monitoring and investiga-
tion, and economic incentives to ensure that the poor are appropri-
ately provided for where the government is involved in providing or
paying for health care services.  Scholars and policymakers should also
pay close attention to enforcement strategies as the new federal over-
haul of the health insurance industry is implemented.362
Second, the goal of crafting enforcement mechanisms so that
they will protect all of a statute’s intended beneficiaries should inform
the way the rights and remedies in a statute are constructed in the first
place.  Where robust public enforcement is not likely to be forthcom-
ing, the question becomes how to design the right and remedy to best
359 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006).
360 See generally 38 U.S.C. § 1710 (2006) (defining extent of health benefits); id.
§ 5100 (providing process to bring private claims respectively); Michael J. Jackonis et
al., War, Its Aftermath, and U.S. Health Policy: Toward a Comprehensive Health Program for
America’s Military Personnel, Veterans, and Their Families, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 677
(2008) (detailing the history and current state of military health services).
361 As with the IDEA, there is likely a difference between private action to obtain
certain services for an individual and private action to change the law more generally.
In each instance, private action in the latter context has the potential to provide posi-
tive externalities to those without financial means, even though private action in the
former context does not.
362 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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achieve the statute’s goals.  The IDEA demonstrates that there are par-
ticular distributional problems associated with relying primarily on
private action to enforce a highly individualized right whose remedies
are also individualized and are determined through significant agency
discretion.  There exist other statutory design choices that may reduce
such distributional problems in enforcement.
For example, one can envision a more generalized right, for
which one person’s private action to effectuate that right achieves the
full extent of the right for everyone else.  In the special education
context, such a right might be the right to a certain number of spe-
cially trained teachers in a school or district, or even a more abstract
requirement to provide appropriate education for children with disa-
bilities generally.  One can also envision an individualized right that
nonetheless cabins agency discretion in providing remedies.  Again in
the special education context, agency officials could conceivably have
a preapproved list of services to offer for certain disability diagnoses.
One can also envision an individualized right resulting in a discretion-
ary remedy that affects more students than only the individual com-
plainant.  Again in the special education context, such remedies
might be systems or services that improve the classroom or school for
everyone, rather than a publicly funded private school placement or
increased services for the particular child who filed the action.363
I do not advocate changing these basic features of institutional
design in the IDEA.  For reasons I have already explained, my goal is
to address enforcement disparities without upsetting the statute’s
political economy.  I mention these examples only to illustrate that it
is possible to adjust different elements of a statute’s design to mini-
mize the disparities associated with a private enforcement regime.
This observation provides a frame of reference to help evaluate
several proposals in the education context to create universal (rather
than means-tested) private rights and private rights of action without
creating any public enforcement mechanisms.  First, consider a pro-
363 See, e.g., HEHIR, supra note 64, at 55–120 (describing the “universal design” R
movement in special education, which promotes teaching strategies, materials, and
technologies that will benefit a wide variety of individuals, not just those with disabili-
ties); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839
(2008) (discussing societal benefits of individual disability accommodations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); cf. Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of
Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 208 (1985)
(noting that one approach to providing special education services for a hearing-
impaired child would be to instruct all students, not simply the disabled one, in sign
language).
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posal to provide IEPs to every child, whether disabled or not.364
Because this suggestion mimics the design features of the IDEA, leav-
ing it to parents to enforce the right to an individualized FAPE would
raise the same set of distributional concerns that private enforcement
in the IDEA does.  If part of the goal of this proposal is to address the
needs of poor children, the proposal may not be the best way to
achieve that goal.
Next, consider a proposal to amend No Child Left Behind to per-
mit individuals to file lawsuits alleging that a state, district, or school is
failing to comply with some provision of the law, such as offering stu-
dents in failing schools the opportunity to transfer to another school
or to receive supplemental educational services such as tutoring.365
This proposal is likely less problematic from a distributional perspec-
tive, because the right is less individualized and discretion is absent; a
successful private lawsuit would result in the offending public actor
making these opportunities available to everyone.
Finally, consider a proposal to turn the education clauses in state
constitutions into a kind of school choice provision.366  While this is
not a question of statutory design but constitutional interpretation,
legislatures frequently pass statutes to effectuate constitutional com-
mands, so the design features of this proposal are relevant to the sub-
ject of this Part.367  As mentioned earlier, state constitution education
clauses are written at a high level of generality, requiring states to pro-
vide, for example, “a thorough and efficient education” or a “uniform
system of free public schools.”368  Over the last four decades, plaintiffs
have brought lawsuits under these clauses seeking the remedy of
increased funding, and courts have largely interpreted these clauses to
impose obligations on school systems rather than to grant any individ-
ualized benefit to a particular child.369  In recent years, however, some
plaintiffs have attempted to seek a different remedy: the opportunity
364 See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE 53–54 (1996);
Rosenbaum, supra note 306; cf. KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 17, at 157–58 (justifying R
the value of IEPs for all low-achieving students, not simply those diagnosed with learn-
ing disabilities).
365 See COMM’N ON NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND, supra note 268, at 182.
366 RYAN, supra note 92, at 237–38. R
367 Indeed, one justification for the IDEA was that states needed a federal statute
to provide greater clarity for their obligations to children with disabilities than did the
lawsuits under the federal Constitution that prompted and provided a model for the
legislation. See, e.g., MELNICK, supra note 43, at 138–44; Neal & Kirp, supra note 51, at R
345–51.
368 McUsic, supra note 107, at 320–26. R
369 See id.
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to attend better schools, whether public or private.370  No case has yet
succeeded, but the argument is not implausible.371
Setting aside the distributional concerns associated with school
choice programs as a substantive matter—the danger of “skimming”
alluded to previously372—the question remains whether this litigation
strategy has the potential to create better educational opportunities
for poor children in failing schools, as its proponents suggest, as a
matter of process.  It seems to me that the answer depends in part on
whether the right and remedy are framed at an individual or a general
level.  If a court determines that the remedy of school choice is availa-
ble only to the named plaintiff(s), then it is likely that the neediest
children are not likely to benefit much, as it is not likely they who will
by and large be bringing suit.  If, in contrast, a court determines that
the remedy is available to the class as a whole, then the neediest chil-
dren are more likely to benefit from the advocacy of relatively more
advantaged children.  This is not merely a theoretical concern.  In the
early days of implementing Brown v. Board of Education, courts fre-
quently ordered integration for the few African-American students
who filed lawsuits without requiring any broader injunctions.373
Those who advocate for this proposal in the name of both equality
and serving poor children should pay close attention to this design
question.
There are trade-offs, to be sure, between, on the one hand, a
broad right and remedy with poor or inequitable enforcement and,
on the other hand, a narrower right and remedy with better or more
equitable enforcement.  How to assess these trade-offs may well be
context specific.  I do not mean to argue that one is always better.  My
point is only that where the goal of a particular reform is to further
equality, and large amounts of public enforcement are unlikely, it is
important to understand the distributional consequences of how the
specific details of the statute’s rights and remedies are designed.
CONCLUSION
Decades of concern about disparities in the use of the IDEA’s
private enforcement mechanisms have produced a host of changes to
those mechanisms with very little reduction in disparities.  Because the
370 See RYAN, supra note 92, at 237. R
371 The argument actually finds some support in the judicial interpretation of the
IDEA’s guarantee of a “free and appropriate public education” to include private
school placements at public expense. See supra note 143. R
372 See supra note 151. R
373 See RYAN, supra note 92, at 52–53. R
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basic features of the IDEA’s institutional design—features that are not
politically likely or are otherwise undesirable to change—unintention-
ally promote these disparities, further tinkering with those mecha-
nisms is not likely to improve enforcement of the law for the poor.
Public enforcement strategies are needed in order to ensure that the
IDEA is adequately and equitably enforced for children in poverty.
More generally, the example of the IDEA demonstrates that the
value of private enforcement can be oversold, both with respect to the
extent to which its availability empowers a statute’s beneficiaries and
with respect to the extent to which it can adequately and equitably
help achieve a statute’s goals.  In designing enforcement mechanisms
and in calling for their reform, policymakers and advocates ought not
let the value of private conduct distract them from acknowledging the
hard work that only public actors can do.  Where public enforcement
is unlikely to be available in sufficient quantity to alleviate distribu-
tional problems, those interested in avoiding such problems should
consider how a statute’s other design features may promote or reduce
them.
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